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AUTOETHNOGRAPHIC REFLECTIONS ON SUBJECTIVITY 
 
AND CHRONIC MENTAL ILLNESS 
 
GERPHA GERLIN 
ABSTRACT 
 This project emerges from engaging and studying the lives, including mine, of the 
many who go—and stay—crazy. Here, I explore the kinds of existences that those 
impaired by severe and persistent mental illness(es), what I refer to henceforth as 
“chronic mental illness”— have had (or been able) to forge and leverage, as well as some 
of the resources and structures they have developed/manipulated in order to do so.  
This thesis explores one way in which chronically mentally ill people exact 
agency over their own embattled personhood. The term “personhood” draws from 
existential traditions in philosophy and theology (Strawson 1959; Taylor 1989, 127-142; 
Rosfort 2018), though I understand and use it here as it is relevant to phenomenological 
psychopathology. By “personhood”, I mean the normative traits of a society wherein 
individuals are recognized by seemingly “common” traits of humanity. While there is 
not, as philosopher Robert Spaemann contends, “a [single] characteristic that can be 
called ‘being a person’” (Spaemann 1996, 14), to understand human beings (being) is to 
also grapple with the ethical demands of intentionality, autonomy, experience, and 
subjectivity.  
By “subjectivity”, I refer to the innumerable and descriptive components that 
comprise individual, relational, and intersubjective experience(s). These components, and 
how they are known and described, emerges from a self-awareness in maneuvering the 
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world and, consequently, developing a particular lifeworld. My interests in personhood 
and subjectivity emerge from the assumption that “the fragility of human identity is 
rooted in the various ways in which our biology challenges our experience of being an 
autonomous self” (Ricoeur 1966; Ricoeur 1970, 472; Rosfort 2018, 5). Part of what 
complicates personal identity is the impossibility of grounding personhood in either 
biological otherness or an intrinsic, pre-reflective selfhood. Being a person is “the task of 
becoming […] concrete […] through the constant encounter with the otherness that is an 
inescapable part of one’s identity” (Rosfort 2018, 6). Seeing a person, Ricoeur believes, 
requires the perpetual examination of experiential tensions among identity traits that go 
beyond biological reductionism and constancy. Illness narratives are useful tools for 
understanding the extent to which disability incites a fundamental interrogation of the 
self, as well as a reckoning of practices of self-recognition and phenomenological 
metamorphosis.  
This multi-field site investigation engages self-identifying psychiatrically disabled 
people via participant-observation at three peer support networks within the greater 
Boston area. Data, by way of stories recounted and collected, is framed by my own lived 
experience participating in similar structures, both in-person and online. Stories from 
both occasions, including interview data and media analysis, are relayed as means of 
triangulation. This project relies on sociologist Noman Denzin’s concept of “cumulative 
epiphanies” (Denzin 1989), or, moments wherein ill authors/speakers recognize the 
extent to which their personhood was honed through the medium of the illness itself 
(Frank 1993, 46). 
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In large part, this project explores ways that people experiencing disabling effects 
of mental illness learn to take care of themselves. It pays particular attention to how the 
personal views of people with such illnesses shape the construction and layout of varied 
peer support networks. Although it considers general psychiatric practice involving 
prescribing clinicians (e.g., physician or nurse practitioner) and non-prescribing clinicians 
(e.g., talk therapists), the central objective is to consider the emergence of mutual 
support, or “self-help” models, as a mode of constructing a new sense of self/advocating 
for unmet needs within traditional medical practice.  
 More broadly, this project maps the reflexive transformation(s) of person into 
patient and the varied methods of healing and treatment that the chronically mentally ill 
utilize in such contexts. It considers the emergence of PSNs as a counter/cultural 
borderland (Kleinman 1980; Garcia 2016) between the social “psy”ences (Matza 2013; 
Raikhel & Bemme 2016) and psychiatry. As a theoretical fusion of history of psychiatry, 
sociology of mental health, and phenomenology, I trouble the parameters within which 
PSNs and their participants help craft, shape, and directing a particular kind of experience 
of mental illness, suffering1, and/or convalescence.  
																																																								
1 By the term “suffering”, I mean it as both a potentially intrinsic component of being as well as 
anguish beyond a strictly corporeal experience.  
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INTRODUCTION 	
This chapter’s goal is three-fold. It first introduces myself as researcher/research 
subject by way of contextualizing my thesis question. Next, it justifies my approach to 
qualitative inquiry, including the specific philosophical assumptions and theoretical 
frameworks within which my thesis project is situated. It concludes with a review of my 
project’s limitations and goals. 
 
About myself and my research question 
 My thesis question wonders how the chronically mentally ill and/or 
psychiatrically disabled (re)constitute a sense of self, in light of the persistent challenges, 
internal and beyond, to the legitimacy of their own subjectivity. Being chronically 
mentally ill myself, I posed this question as a means of perhaps learning how better to 
manage my symptoms/myself.  
 The central contention is that mental illness, when considered as a potentially 
chronic [and, subsequently degenerative], condition is to be viewed along a spectrum. 
Psychiatry, as an institution and as a technology of care, has had the confounding effect 
of being helpful to some sufferers and harmful to others. By “helpful”, I mean that 
psychiatric care, for some chronically mentally ill, has sustained their livelihood in ways 
that other modes of care could/did not. By “harmful”, I mean that this same system, for 
some chronically mentally ill, has had deleterious effects on quality of life [and will to 
live]. 
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My data—which includes the lived experience of navigating various systems of 
treatment and care—suggest that, in the latter case, sufferers have had to imagine and 
implement modes of care that could either replace and/or supplement what is typically 
offered/popularly available. My project explores just one way—the development of what 
I have termed “peer support networks” (PSNs)—as an enigmatic approach to both 
thinking about2 and caring for one’s self (Frank 1993).  
 
Approach to qualitative inquiry 
My project falls under the large umbrella of narrative research. Narrative research 
involves the collection of stories, preferably through a collaboration among story-tellers, 
which includes [the] researcher(s). Here, the term “narrative” refers to both the 
phenomenon under observation [in my case, the illness narratives of the psychiatrically 
disabled] and as a kind of research method [via forms of collecting, processing, and 
shaping data] (Creswell 2013, 70). Narrative research typically re-stories, or, reorganizes 
accounts via a particular system of causal links. Note, however, that this project does not 
progress linearly. I disrupt three-dimensional narratives and juxtapose details to emergent 
themes where/when I find them relatable to one another, or to a point I am trying to 
make. In line with Bruner’s narrative theory of mind, the stories I’ve “negotiated, 
situated, and interpreted” (Mattingly et al. 2008) here are vehicles through the culturally 
canonical (or, dominant societal expectations behind neuro-typicality) and the 
																																																								
2 Realizing illness as an occasion for self-change as well as an identity [component] to adapt oneself to. 
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extraordinary (or, “departures from those norms meaningful in terms of established 
patterns of beliefs” (Bruner 1990, 47)). 
 Because I am a chronically mentally ill person interested in engaging with other 
chronically mentally ill people, I adopted autoethnography as a narrative study procedure. 
Autoethnographies relate the personal story of the author/researcher to dichotomies and 
discourse present within a particular culture. I leverage being mentally ill as a passport 
into typically siloed microcosms, peer-directed support groups and forums. 
I will elaborate upon this method/genre in the ensuing Methods chapter. 
 
Philosophical assumptions and theoretical paradigms 
 My thesis juxtaposes ontological and epistemological qualms. It is fueled by 
interests in discerning the “true” nature of reality and its multiplicities, as well as how the 
subjective informs knowledge-production.  
These assumptions manifest in the following guiding questions: 
• What does3 it mean to experience “x”, and what are the essential—and 
presumably universal—structures that reinforce such a phenomenon? 
• How, and by whom, are these supporting claims justified as true/knowledge? 
Acknowledging the two means paying careful attention to how, when, and under what 
pressures, the individual experiences of my target population—chronically mentally ill 
people who participate in PSNs—are expressed interpersonally. As a researcher who has 
little “objective separateness” (Guba and Lincoln 1988, 94) from her object of inquiry, I 																																																								
3 As opposed to “could”, for the latter modal connotes a greater sense of wavering certainty. 
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must also trouble the accuracy of my data collection and interpretation methods. 
Bracketing, while widely employed in social sciences, is less helpful to my study, for my 
study is generated from my daily life experience. To ensure that my reconstruction of 
stories [literally, the lives/livelihood of others] is as honest as any reformulation can be, I 
employ methods related to phenomenological data analysis.  
These include:  
• The process of “horizontalization” (Moustakas 1994), or, identifying and 
finetuning the significant statements and ideas emergent from the various modes 
of data collection4 
• Interpolating writing techniques that can provide both textural descriptions5 and 
structural descriptions6 
My interpretive frameworks incorporate postmodernism and disability studies. I am 
interested in how the multiplicity of personal identity [and the language used to express 
these selves] is mediated within larger relational contexts [that include, and trouble, 
perspectives of class, gender, race, creed, religion, ability status, and so on]. When 
thinking about the relationship between anthropology and disability studies, I focus on 
the shifting paradigms within which specific behaviors [or “symptoms”] and general 
states of being are pathologized.  
 
 
																																																								
4 These methods include participant observation, interview transcripts, and media analysis.  
5 Verbatim reiterations of the data 
6 An analysis of the contexts within which the phenomenon was experienced 
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Limitations 
I realize the phrase “chronic mental illness” is buzzworthy. It likely, for instance, 
would attract more attention from random passerby on the street than, say, autoimmune 
hepatitis—despite both being chronic, poorly understood, and potentially lethal. I 
recognize that, given the curiosity surrounding the former, much ado can be made about 
what this project should/could have included, discussed, or done. While I will not attempt 
to rid potential readers of all their biases, I will, however, try justifying the decisions 
behind the design of my project.  
Note that this project is not extensive. Although I have collected personal data 
surrounding peer support for chronic mental illness, this project does not consider the 
whole of my suffering with disease and attempts at recovery. It instead considers how, for 
some sufferers, PSNs—akin to medications and formal talk therapies—can provide a 
means through which the self can be reconstituted and one’s soul can be “recovered” [as 
in re-located/“found”]. These networks, I am realizing, are tangible Shwerdian models of 
“interaction between psychological universals and the culturally particular and universal 
dimensions of social life that comprise the core dialectic of human experience” 
(Kleinman & Good 1985, 22).  
It also does not consider the whole of what might qualify as a PSN. I realize that 
there are many instances of peer support that are still very-much peer-driven beyond the 
three networks I participated in. I realize the majority of literature cited is neither clinical 
or scientific [e.g., cited from a medical or scientific journal or textbook]. I include only a 
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handful of statistics and no tables or charts. My figures are mostly images of material 
culture directly sourced from my PSNs.  
My personal stories are reduced and shared only where relevant [e.g., as a 
supporting example to a story shared by a peer during a specific therapeutic session that I 
observed during my year of graduate research]. Given my orientation in psychological 
anthropology, I should recognize previous efforts in detailing experiences of mental 
illness ethnographically—perhaps most notably, Emily Martin’s Bipolar Expeditions and 
Janis Jenkins’s Pharmaceutical Self. Some of my stylistic techniques straddle the border 
between critical ethnography and analytic autoethnography. I found most stylistically 
influential, however, Nora Groce’s ethnography of deafness on Martha’s Vineyard, 
Everyone Here Spoke Sign Language; the second is Robert Murphy’s memoir, The Body 
Silent.  While both books share discussions of disability and personhood, they do so in 
different ways, as well as from varying perspectives: Groce’s dissertation-turned into-oral 
history and Murphy’s last-known collected body of work prior to his 1990 death. While 
neither pathographies discussed mental illness exclusively, Groce’s candidness regarding 
her ability status and Murphy’s articulation of the “damaged self” are both equally 
pressing issues in how I’ve designed my project and chosen to conduct my research [as a 
chronically mentally ill person “studying” other chronically mentally ill people].  
Like Groce, I am studying a social microcosm (Martha’s Vineyard/PSNs). Like 
Groce, I’m wondering whether (and why) the health conditions prevalent in this 
community render them disabled or differently abled, and to what extent. Like Groce, I 
am studying the performance of illness/disability outside of a medical institution. And 
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like Murphy, I also have an interest in compulsory able-bodiedness and the sin/sainthood 
dilemma often faced by the disabled.  
I was most struck with how Groce grapples with her position (of power) as a 
hearing person conducting research on/with deaf people and how Murphy acquiesces to a 
life without restitution.  
  I limited my citations, save for those in my Methods chapter, to theorists in 
critical disability studies [a field that includes historians, sociologists, philosophers, 
literary scholars, clinicians, among others] and psychiatric anthropology. This project is 
less concerned with aggregated, quantitative data and more-so with the structures that 
illuminate the nuanced stories of daily disability. 
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CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND 
 
 
 The background chapter first presents approaches to the ways in which mental 
illness is conceptualized. It next offers ways that phenomenology can be a helpful 
conceptual framework for conducting psychiatric anthropology, especially as it pertains 
to identity-development. Afterwards, it reviews the compounded effects of industry 
reform and the 1960s anti-psychiatry movement.  
 
Picturing “mental illness” 
 
From the earliest recordings of time, people have been concerned with bouts of 
“abnormality” and ways of controlling its expression. Contemporary psychiatric medicine 
can trace much of its etiological traditions well beyond Hippocrates (Ahonen 2014, 1).  
Trepanations—the prehistoric cursory to lobotomies and similar clinical 
interventions—demonstrate an attempt to link abnormality to mental dysfunction and 
precariously position the mind within the brain/skull (Loughborough 1946).  
 
Figure 1: Medieval 
rendition of 
trepanation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Medieval rendition of trepanation. 
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Trepanation, tracing its etymology to the Greek trypanon, means “borer; to 
auger.” It was believed that intracranial pressure that could be expunged upon the boring 
a hole into the human skull and subsequent exposure of the dura mater (Arani et al. 
2012). The sources of this pent-up pressure varied from injury to the head to supernatural 
possession and were said to cause symptoms related to migraines, seizures, and, above 
all, mental distress.  
Some ancient philosophers supposed that, because mental illness warped one’s 
cognitive faculties (including reasoning and perception), the disorder was not one of the 
body, but instead an affliction of the soul. Aristotelians, Platonists (including the 
anatomist Galen), and Epicureans alike conceded that the intellect, or nature of the soul, 
was subject to the same degradation and harm as was the physical body (Ahonen 2014, 
3). However, instead of attempting to reconstruct ancient theories or posit their scientific 
credibility, this thesis (in part) will explore how similar practices of 
psychopathologization have endured through contemporary systems of psychiatric 
thought and care.  
Mental distress, or madness, is nothing new. “Madness,” as clinical psychologist 
Larry Davidson reckons, “has permeated the history of Western thought as perhaps no 
other human condition with the possible exception of love” (Davidson 2003, 16). Despite 
a spectacle for the ages, approaches to the subjective experience of distress and the social 
constructions of madness remain invariably contested. Histories of psychiatry have yet to 
produce epistemologically reliable understandings of psychopathological invariants. To 
reach psychiatric diagnostic validity (or, the extent to which diagnostic criteria and 
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clinical prognoses reflect true and reliable phenomena in nature) calls for the periodical 
calibration of psychiatric jargon. Calibration means adjusting diagnostic criteria to 
relevant breakthroughs in clinical and cultural data (Berrios 1996, 11).  
 
On phenomenology and the power/qualms of descriptive practice 
While neurocognitive assessments function as valuable technological approaches 
to the study of mental illnesses, much remains unknown about the nature of these 
conditions beyond, and including, their status as brain disease. Psychiatry’s inability to 
“self-vindicate” (Hacking 1992) from the superficial confines of the wet laboratory, is in 
part because “the phenomena that it addresses—persons deemed to be ailing in particular 
ways—are not [only] laboratory subjects” (Rose and Abi-Rached 2013, 138). Since 
1962’s rise of the “psy”ences, there has emerged “psychopharmacological societies” 
(Rose 2003, 46). Two central beliefs contributed to their proliferation: a) the roots of 
observable behaviors are manifested through the quasi-idiopathic interactions of the likes 
of genetic sequences, developmental processes, neuroplasticity, the built environment, 
and one’s nutritional state (Rose and Abi-Rached 2013, 139); b) faculties related to 
human subjectivity can (and, whenever possible) should be manipulated through the use 
of drugs (Rose 2003, 46). The Decade of the Brain (1990-2000) ushered into psychiatric 
thought and practice the urgent need to stabilize diagnostic criteria, or, to give them 
counterfactual and subjunctive import that could clearly link behavioral anomaly to 
symptom, disease to treatment eligibility, and diagnosis to prognosis.  
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The psychopharmaceutical push to apply the sciences of single-nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs) and function of genome-wide association studies (GWAS) has 
yielded somewhat underwhelming results. Not only are there unclear routes from 
psychiatric phenotypes to SNPs, but GWAS signals are relatively weak in psychiatry and 
the functional pathways that are implicated are nonspecific to psychiatric disorders (Rose 
and Abi-Rached 2013, 139). Even the discovery of biomarkers is unpromising. Were they 
to be identified, Rose and Abi-Rached argue, the best they could potentially indicate is 
the extent to which resilience, genetic, and other neurobiological factors modulate 
increases to symptom susceptibility under certain environmental conditions (Singh and 
Rose 2009; Rose and Abi-Rached 2013, 193). Translational neuroscience and the 
exploration of brain mechanisms is important, though it can tempt clinicians and 
researchers alike into asserting premature claims about the “true” root of mental illnesses 
or factors that shape its duration, level of impairment, nature of psychic affliction, and/or 
the kinds of care needed.  
So, what is phenomenology? What place does it have in this thesis, let alone in 
understandings of psychiatry?  
Phenomenology refers to both “an empirical, qualitative methodology for research 
in the social sciences and to the school of philosophical thought from which these 
methods were derived” (Davidson 2003, 3). We can trace phenomenology’s heritage to 
“founder”, mathematician, Edmund Husserl, in the early 1900s. In line with Cartesian 
and Kantian metaphysics, Husserl contended that all claims to knowledge and truth 
would only ever be revealed to the human conscious through a series of experiences. As a 
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human-centered science, psychology borrows from philosophical phenomenology the 
idea that the “structure and components of experience itself” (Davidson 2003, 4) allow 
for the “identification, categorization, and comparison of psychiatric conditions across 
people...” (Davidson 2003, 3). Traditional approaches to scientific inquiry make little to 
no room for the more speculative wiles of the social sciences and their embrace of, if not 
frustrating intrigue, in human subjectivity (Daston 1992).  
Because qualitative research assumes that more forms of knowledge about any 
particular object of inquiry exist, phenomenology is to the field what Francis Bacon’s 
positivism was to experimental psychology (Davidson 2003, 17). Philosophical 
phenomenology probes the nature of these multiplicities, the “more” of everyday life, 
while examining these mores within the social networks that they emerge from. 
Phenomenological description is concerned with a component of recovery aptly titled 
“taking stock of the self” (Davidson 2003, 7; Davidson & Strauss 1992). 
Philosophical phenomenology emphasizes the intersubjectivity of nature and how 
it is experienced, or what Husserl himself described as the “flow of phenomena.” To 
explore potential relationships between experiences (and the meanings derived from such 
interactions) is to “pursue knowledge of a kind of being that is constantly in flux” 
(Davidson 2003, 22). A phenomenological approach affords qualitative researches 
indirect access to another’s of another’s subjective capacities through the Husserlian 
mediation of empathy” (Davidson 1989, 210).  
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Problematizing modes of description, Husserl suggested, shed light onto “the 
things themselves” (Wertz 2015): the most authentic depictions, as much from the 
perspective of the demographic in question, as possible.  
 
 
Troubling psychiatric nosology  
Ironically, nearing the second advent of biological psychiatry came a striking 
hostility towards the pathologization of mankind and the authority of the psychiatrist. No 
sooner had biological psychiatrists been “[…] able to investigate the causes and 
treatments of [..] illness by using the scientific method” (Shorter 1997, 272) had a 
handful of intellectuals come to barter against the medicalization of previously construed 
social ills. Since psychiatrists then (and arguably, still) were not considered as “basic 
scientists” but instead as “clinicians”, the public expectation was that, as such, 
psychological clinicians should “[make] patients feel good while helping them to feel 
better” (Shorter 1997, 272). This mission, according to leftist writers, could not be 
accomplished without psychiatrists first realizing their function as “the ‘controlling arm 
of the bourgeoisie’” (Shorter 1997, 274). 
The primary contest was with the ardent belief that mental illness does not come 
to exist in the mind—if at all—without first being perpetuated within a larger socio-
political nexus. Philosopher Michel Foucault realized that the notion of mental illness 
was relatively recent and inextricably intertwined with a larger problem of bio-political 
surveillance. Mental illnesses, like the labels associated with them, were socially 
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constructed. And as anything else that is “made up”, so it was argued, the stigma 
associated with pathological deviance could then be broken down. 
The early 1960s saw a series of particularly influential supporting arguments—
many of which are still referenced, albeit with some level of contest, in social studies of 
medicine discourse. Perhaps the most recognized is Thomas Szasz’s The Myth of Mental 
Illness, wherein the physician and anti-psychiatrist scolded the field as being 
“scientifically worthless and socially harmful.” The sociologist Erving Goffman’s 
Asylums furthered Szasz’s contempt as a first-person account of admission into an 
asylum. Goffman described the hospital (what one traditionally considers a palliative 
setting) to “a total institution” and his transformation into patient as a form of 
incarceration.  
Social scientists (including psychiatrists) soon became consumed with the ethics 
of institutionalization. If mental illnesses were but a tool of social control, then asylums, 
they presumed, were no more convalescent than they were forms of unlawful 
imprisonment. The message was two-fold: 1) psychiatric patients weren’t really patients, 
but instead types of people deemed deviant (unruly) by hegemonic cultural norms; and 2) 
consequently, any diagnosis “[…] said nothing about the person…[and] instead meant 
that the system was incapable of accommodating deviance” (Shorter 1997, 276). 
Since mental illness was believed to be primarily inorganic, antipsychotics and 
electro-convulsive therapies, they argued, only damaged the brain. Because the 
symptoms originated within society (and only manifested within the self), any attempt at 
treating the body were veiled efforts at disciplining (and attempting to eradicate) 
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undesirable behaviors or personal idiosyncrasies. Some writers, like the Scottish 
psychiatrist R.D. Laing, went as far as to propose mental illness—particularly 
schizophrenia—as a medium for “[…] explor[ing] the inner space and time of 
consciousness” (Shorter 1997, 276). Laing later described negative symptoms as a means 
of deceiving the ubiquitous oppression of neurotypicality. The schizophrenic, he 
believed, was neither crazy nor ill. He was simply “playing at being mad”, merely 
“throw[ing] dangerous people off…[his] scent” (Shorter 1997).  
The abolition of custodial psychiatric care within the US emerged as a by-product 
of larger mental health reform movements. The 1940s mental hygiene efforts, and Albert 
Deutsch’s 1940 expose, The Shame of the States, portrayed an administrative system 
deeply entrenched in paternalistic indifference. Perhaps most revealing were the 
photographs of the squalid living conditions that many of the patients endured. Deutsch, 
for example, paints scenes of patients atop one another in sleeping camps, of hundreds of 
men nude and immersed in their own filth—“like a scene out of Dante’s Inferno” 
(Shorter 1997, 278).  
This medical tourism raised public anxiety about the living conditions associated 
with being condemned to institutionalization. Between 1946 and 1950, for example, 
almost 80 percent of all patients under 65 were released within five years of their 
admittance to Pennsylvania’s Warren State Hospital. The 1946 Mental Health Act created 
a federal department charged with overseeing the mental wellbeing of the US and, more 
specifically, developing “therapeutic communities” wherein reformed patients could 
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reacclimate to a world outside of red bricks. Larger scale efforts at reintroducing patients 
to the community were underway by 1954.  
The Food and Drug Act Administration licensed new antipsychotics that could be 
prescribed to ex-patients whose nervous systems were likely inhibited by the “iatrogenic 
results of institutionalization” (Shorter 1997, 279). The antipsychotic chlorpromazine was 
intended to “calm agitated patients and abolish psychosis with drugs [so that] patients 
could…live quite easily in normal community settings until the psychosis finally just 
burned itself out” (Shorter 1997, 279). By 1988, the number of patients in state and 
county hospitals decreased by 80 percent—from a “historic” high of 559,000 to just 
under 400,000. With this institutional transition came a shift in the locus of care. Whereas 
in 1955, 77 percent of all “patient care episodes” occurred within the auspices of the 
asylum, by 1990, the rate reduced to 26 percent.  
However well-intended, the initiation of such spaces was poorly realized. Shorter 
relays how a British psychiatrist, upon reflecting of his time spent in the US, described 
the reality as one of “be[ing] discharged and…damned.” The new drugs introduced new 
problems. Perhaps one of the more pervasive side-effects, the neurological condition 
tardive dyskinesia, left patients with more socially isolating characteristics. Symptoms 
included grotesque twitches and spasms. One in three homeless persons were suffering 
some form of diagnosable mental illness, oftentimes so debilitating that they were unable 
to secure steady employment [or any hope of stable shelter]. Others interfaced with the 
criminal justice system. Instead of cooperative living arrangements, many ex-patients 
were instead received by nursing homes and boarding houses, arguably a proxy of the 
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institutionalization they’d just escaped.  These so-called “street people”, the British 
psychiatrist mused, once had “a home…and […] were cared for” while hospitalized. 
Despite the inadequacies of their treatment, these “[…] hapless, helpless, chronically sick 
people” (Shorter 1997, 281) were certainly much worse now than they ever were as in-
house patients.  
The 1980s ushered in a third kind of hygienic reform. Deinstitutionalization had 
backfired. While the intent was to destroy the deplorable conditions associated with the 
asylum, they had instead been replicated en masse, in public. By 1988, the number of 
private psychiatric hospitals in the US increased from 150 to 444. In an effort to (quite 
literally) clean up the streets, general hospitals began re-admitting ex-patients. While the 
majority of the 1.6 million Americans hospitalized for psychiatric illness were admitted 
to a general hospital, the fact that mental healthcare was once again relegated to the 
autonomy of a total institution suggested failure. “Community psychiatry, though worthy 
in spirit, had become discredited as a practical means of treating… [mental illness]” 
(Shorter 1997, 281). Ironically, community efforts could not demonstrate an ability to 
cure what was once thought to be purely socially-constituted. 
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODS 
 
This chapter begins by justifying autoethnography as the method best suited for 
my project interests. It outlines my approach to conducting fieldwork that was approved 
by Boston University’s School of Medicine Institutional Review Board before next 
identifying tensions surrounding my positionality as potential researcher/research subject. 
It closes with a description of pervasive research conduct challenges and my attempts at 
mediating them. 
 
On autoethnography 
As an autoethnographic form of inquiry, my thesis explores formulations of 
mental health, illness, and their confounded impact on identity-formation and 
development. I use the term “inquiry” here as opposed to “study”, fearing that the latter 
establishes a more stringent binary between myself, as master’s candidate/researcher, and 
the peers I have engaged with as research participants.  
Autoethnography is both a genre of writing and a qualitative research method. 
Carolyn Ellis, one of its originators, writes:  
“Autoethnography refers to ethnographic research, writing, story, and method that 
connect the autobiographical and personal to the cultural, social, and political. In 
autoethnography, the life of the researcher becomes a conscious part of what is studied” 
(Ellis 2008, 48).  
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This method requires of the author a consistent and critical re-assessment of 
his/her personal experience in order to connect frame personal narrative within wider 
cultural, political, and social meanings and understandings. More specifically, to avoid a 
“viol[ation] [of] the internal confidentiality of relational others” (Tollich 2010, 1599), I 
posit my project as an analytic autoethnography (Anderson 2006). The analytic, as 
opposed to “evocative”, autoethnography lets me exercise a greater range of relational 
interpretation/dialogue with informants [research participants/peers] besides myself.  
I found this method especially productive, and felt prepared to pursue it, given 
that I live with chronic mental illness and I also identify as being psychiatrically disabled. 
My attempts at convalescence include having engaged a number of consumer advocacy 
and PSNs, both in-person and online. I have experience organizing and leading said 
forums, and, since 2015, have been one of seven facilitators of an online mental illness 
advocacy community, http://www.mentalillnessmouse.tumblr.com. Likewise, I have 
worked at the intersection of peer advocacy and efficacy research at Yale University 
School of Medicine’s Program in Recovery and Community Health (PRCH), under its 
director, Larry Davidson, Ph.D. 
I am privy to the somewhat intrinsic other-ing processes of 
academia/anthropological work. But what does it mean to be a part of the phenomena in 
question? Consequently, I attempt a hyper-awareness of implicit biases that would work 
to distance myself, a mentally ill graduate student broadly interested in experiences of 
other mentally ill people, from the myriad of mentally ill people, both “purposefully” and 
inadvertently, that I interact with. I realize very little separates me from the people I 
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observe. In this project, I engaged in three PSNs within the Boston area, actively 
participating in the meetings of these groups, and subsequently taking de-identified field 
notes of my observations and experiences. Simultaneously, I was researcher, research 
subject, and research instrument.  
As a mode of narrative inquiry, autoethnography allows researchers to examine 
representations of experience, and interpretation of meaning, through inter-personal 
story-telling. This method considers the researcher to be part of the research subject. To 
be successful, the (auto)ethnographer must be received as “a full member in the research 
group or setting” s/he engages with, is visible as such a member in published texts, and is 
“committed to an analytic research agenda focused on improving theoretical 
understandings of broader social phenomenon” (Anderson 2006, 375). 
 
Identifying PSNs in the greater Boston area  
I identified three PSNs of interest. The first two were the Boston Resource Center 
(BRC) and the Alternatives to Suicide (A2S) group. Both are members of regional 
recovery-learning communities (RLCs). The Massachusetts Department of Mental Health 
defines RLCs as “consumer-run networks of self-help/peer support, information and 
referral, advocacy and training activities” (Mass.gov). Though every Massachusetts-
based RLC receives some state funding, they operate independently of one another.  
In general, RLCs (like many kinds of PSNs) include self-determination and 
advocacy as core principles. Massachusetts’ RLCs are “open to all individuals with a 
serious mental illness; work collaboratively with mental health providers, other human 
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service agencies, and the community at large [...]; and are designed to appeal to [...] 
people of all racial and ethnic backgrounds and people of all co-occurring disabilities” 
(Mass.gov). The third was the Framingham chapter of the HVN, an international peer-led 
advocacy organization spearheaded in the United Kingdom.  
 
Establishing rapport across field sites  
Before participating in any PSN, I tried to establish myself as both peer and 
student researcher. I met, for example, with the leadership committee of the BRC. I 
identified myself by name and occupation to lead facilitators of the A2S group. I 
identified myself by name to one of the two peer specialists leading the Framingham 
HVN chapter. Next, I familiarized myself with whatever group charters/bylaws existed 
for each PSN.7 I obtained a copy of the charters and defining principles for both the BRC 
and the Western Massachusetts RLC. The Framingham chapter of the HVN has not 
developed an independent charter/set of group by-laws and instead directed me to general 
online materials.  
 
Creating a schedule  
I started attending group meetings for all three of the aforementioned PSNs 
regularly (weekly attending at least one site) mid-spring 2018. The BRC (located within 
the Solomon Carter Fuller Mental Health Center (SCFMHC)) is open from 10am to 3pm 
on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays. The BRC maintains a rotating schedule of 																																																								
7 I will present and analyze these documents in the following first analytical chapter.  
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programs. The Framingham chapter of the HVN meets in space rented from Plymouth 
Church (87 Edgell Road) every Thursday from 3pm to 4pm. The A2S group meets in 
space rented at the Mystic Valley Community Room (50 Middlesex Avenue, Somerville) 
every Thursday from 6:30pm to 8pm.  
I attended “Dual Recovery Anonymous Meeting” at the BRC from 12pm to 
12:45pm on Thursdays, the Hearing Voices group from 3pm to 4pm on Thursdays, and 
the A2S group from 6:30pm to 8pm on Thursday evenings. Given the proximity of the 
BRC to the Medical campus, I decided to commute there using public transit. I would 
commute between Framingham and Somerville using my personal vehicle. 
 
Collecting data  
I engaged in participant-observation, a method through which ethnographers 
observe a particular culture-sharing group and participate within that cultural setting 
(Jorgensen 1989).  
Based on my experience with PSNs and navigating mental health care systems, I 
functioned as a complete participant within the support group sessions at each PSN. This 
involved: being present; adhering to individual group guidelines for each PSN; raising 
general questions; volunteering to lead discussion; answering questions directed to 
myself; offering insight, mediating foreseeable moments of conflict between disagreeing 
peers; tidying common areas, and the like. In addition to performing the aforementioned, 
while visiting the BRC, I also attended monthly community meetings with other member 
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Figure 2: Partial screenshot of online PSN, Mental Illness Mouse’s, FAQ page. 
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organizations of the MBRLC and its institutional and fiscal partners. 
When I served as a moderator for an online mental illness awareness community, 
I conducted virtual participant-observation. I served in this role between approximately 
four to six hours per week on a rotating schedule shared with other volunteer moderators. 
 
Using netnography to understand online PSNs 
With the advent of the Internet, and, consequently, new objects of inquiry for 
qualitative researchers, also came the proliferation of netnography. The word is a 
portmanteau that nods to both its origins, the InterNET, and its research methodology, 
ethnoGRAPHy. Netnography emerged as a tool for studying 1990s fan cultures and 
gauging their reactions via online, closed text-based groups. The term (and practice) was 
developed by Robert Krozinets, assistant professor of marketing at Northwestern 
University’s Graduate School of Management, to analyze the Star Trek franchise/fandom. 
Krozinets grew interested in how the emergence of online communities influenced 
patterns [and attitudes related to] media consumption.  
These early forums, not unlike those contemporary, united strangers through 
topics of mutual interest. Intrigued by the extent to which anonymous virtual consumers 
relied on each other as objective sources of information, Krozinets has described 
netnography as “a new qualitative research methodology that adapts ethnographic 
research techniques to the study of cultures and communities emerging through 
computer-mediated communications” (Krozinets 2002, 2). While influenced by 
traditional tenets of ethnographic work, the method, as a marketing research tool, has 
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distinct differences in both its larger theoretical framework and application.  
 
Relating netnography and ethnography 
Ethnography is a research method primarily employed by anthropologists, as well 
as globally within the social sciences. As an “open-ended” (Krozinets 2002, 3) practice, 
ethnography has become associated with any research project that attempts to “provide a 
detailed, in-depth description of [people and their] everyday life and practice 
(BrianHoey.com)”, or what forefather Clifford Geertz would have described as “thick 
descriptions that [enlarge]…the universe of human discourse” (Geertz 1973, 314). 
The crux of this system is based on participation-observation where the acuity of 
the data collected is based upon not only what is examined, but how, through his/her own 
reflexivity, it is performed. Ethnography typically yields “grounded knowledge” [a type 
of understanding emergent from a particular context and set of actors and circumstances] 
that then can be generalized and/or adapted. Geertz has likened the conducting of 
ethnography to reading a manuscript written in a foreign language, on faded paper, and 
laden with “ellipses, incoherencies, suspicious emendations, and tendentious 
commentaries” (Geertz 1973, 314). As such, ethnography is the interpretation of culture. 
The ethnographer—and their “observations, records, and analyses”—function as public 
transliterations of cultural meaning.  
Both methods rely on a field-site, and consequently, have a definable process of 
fieldwork. For someone conducting a netnography, the field-site is virtual and, with the 
sophistication of new media, has expanded beyond online forums to include blogging 
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platforms, social media and networking sites, videocasting, and some video games. Both 
methods attempt Geertz’s thick description of culture/s.  
 Netnography benefits from what Krozinets calls an intrinsic voyeurism. That is, 
someone conducting a netnography is less concerned with how well the virtual 
presentation of selves aligns with related off-line identities. Instead, the netnographer’s 
interests lie in the communication within these particular platforms, not necessarily on 
who communicates them. Netnographers understand that the ubiquitous anonymity [or, 
concerted effort at concealing/re-shaping one’s identity] of online spaces is what makes it 
so conducive to studying “stigmatic phenomena, situations, conversations, or encounters, 
which might otherwise be more difficult to study face-to-face” (Costello et al., 2017). 
The netnographer, Krozinets urges, must remember that s/he analyzes not the 
whole of a community’s lifeworld, but instead a tailored series of communicated acts.  
Netnography aims to improve the “fuzzy front end of the product innovation process.” 
Netnographers identify: a) types of users within online communities; b) market trends 
based on the data rendered by the lead users of online communities; c) “latent needs and 
innovative concepts for in-profit settings” (Costello et al., 2017). 
 
Constructing the self in a mediated world8 
 I am one of several moderators of an online peer forum that speaks to people with 
lived experience of mental illness. I’ve been moderating at this particular blog for four 
																																																								
8 This subtitle is borrowed from the actual book title: Constructing the Self in a Mediated World 
(Sage Publications, 1996) and is a part of the larger “Inquiries and Social Construction” series.  
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years. In some ways, moderators function as virtual peer specialists. We 
facilitate/mediate often tense conversations; we present information that will (hopefully) 
supplement our advocacy efforts or, at the very least, aid in someone’s convalescence; 
and we suffer. Although verification isn’t a part of our moderator application, it’s 
somehow accepted that the moderators are “professional sufferers.” We trust so much in 
our extensive body of days in bed, self-harm, suicidal ideation, hospitalizations, and other 
breaks from reality that we feel compelled to: a) seek the comfort/validation that often 
comes with convening like-minded individuals; b) speak on these experiences [lest we 
implode]; c) do so authoritatively. 
 All of the moderators of this particular forum are public about their suffering as 
well as their recovery attempts [failures and frustrations]. My fellow moderators knew I 
was conducting an autoethnography focused on my own recovery attempts [failures and 
frustrations], and, consequently, their own. Relaying this mode of healing into a research 
project involved a delicate weaving of respect for ensuring confidentiality and the 
integrity of the story shared. Most relevant to this thesis is the opportunity for 
netnographic technique to yield nuanced insight into what it can be like to be sick—what 
is typically considered a solitary act, especially in the case of stigmatized conditions like 
mental illness.  
 Following participant-observation meetings, I reflected upon my own 
experiences, responses, and insights in fieldnotes. The leadership team at the BRC, in the 
interest of maintaining the comfort of others peers, prohibited me from taking notes 
during most group sessions/activities. Given this restriction, I did not take any written 
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fieldnotes at any site. I took fieldnotes in a nondescript black notebook only after the 
conclusion of each group meeting. The notebook remains in a locked cabinet drawer with 
its key secured in a separate location. 
To triangulate my data, I conducted semi-structured, open-ended interviews, using 
a related consent process and an interview guide. All interviews were conducted only 
with clinicians who work with people with chronic mental illness, and/or with qualitative 
researchers who study the experiences of people with chronic mental illness. No self-
identifying peers at any of the PSNs were interviewed. 
I based my literature review off of an annotated bibliography submitted for a 
previous class. Because my being a student privileges me with free access to an array of 
resources, I began the majority of my searches using the Boston University Libraries 
search engines: “Basic” and “Advanced.” The “favorites” option allowed me to 
bookmark extraneous pieces—references that were either tangentially or theoretically 
relevant to my project, but of interest nonetheless; or references I wanted to revisit for 
personal reflection.  
There are several ways to consume media. In addition to reading widely, I curated 
two YouTube.com playlists, entitled “Thesis help” and “Context.” Within these playlists 
are videos of scholarly interviews; University lectures; speeches and presentations; book 
readings and related talks; and so on. That these were online resources was helpful given 
that I am often bedridden. 
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Figure 3: Partial list of tangential resources. 
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Figure 4: Sample videos in personal YouTube.com playlist. 
 
Engaging with interviewees (research participants) and peers (target research 
population) 
 To recruit research participants (people I wanted to formally interview), I used 
maximum variation sampling. This strategy “documents diverse variations of individuals 
or sites based on specific characteristics” (Miles & Huberman 1994, 28). Doing so 
increases the likelihood that the data collected will reflect differences among the 
participants and/or differences in life experiences/perspectives. 
 I initiated contact with all prospective interviewees through e-mail (using my 
Boston University google account). The e-mails consisted of a script informing potential 
interviewees: a) of my project’s aim and intent; b) my background/interest in the field; c) 
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why I expressed interest in specifically interviewing him/her; d) the kinds of questions 
that would/could be asked; and e) the use of the data (interview). Every e-mail was sent 
individually rather than as part of an e-mail “blast”/“chain mail.” I informed all potential 
interviewees that their participation in any semi-structured, open-ended interview with 
me was both voluntary and subject to end at his/her discretion.  
 I conducted five formal interviews with five research participants: three 
qualitative researchers and two Boston-area clinicians familiar with the needs of Boston-
area PSN demographics. I also held a series of informal recorded conversations (total 
seven via hand-written notes) over Skype with an additional two qualitative researchers 
and in-person with one additional Boston-area clinician.  
 Research participants included: a clinical social worker employed by a hospital; a 
qualitative health psychologist; a disability studies scholar; a psychiatrist practicing in 
community-based settings (e.g., clinics); and a general practitioner in private practice. All 
research participants were white, self-identified males, between 29 and 56 years old. Not 
all of these interviews are presented as data in this project. 
 I designed my interview protocol to yield specific insights into the experiences of 
practitioners directly working with individuals living with chronic mental illness and of 
qualitative researchers with shared interests in patient advocacy and self-help movements 
and disability studies history and rights. I offered to conduct interviews through a 
medium selected and agreed upon by both the research participant and myself (eg, Skype, 
in-person [given that the participant lived within a ten-mile radius of my home zip code], 
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over the phone, or through continued e-mail exchange). However, the majority of my 
interviews were over the phone.9  
 After completing the informed consent process10, I began the interview. All 
interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. In subsequent writing, clinicians were 
referred to by their specialty (e.g., ‘psychiatrist’, ‘social worker’). No information 
regarding sexual orientation, religious identity, class, and/or disability status was 
collected.   
 Because of the intrinsically private and sensitive nature of these PSN groups, I 
took similar security measures when it came to protecting the confidentiality of my 
research “subjects” as well.  
 I de-identified data by using pseudonyms, aliases, and altering all personal details 
(e.g., someone’s age) and space (e.g., the exact names and locations of any of the PSNs 
observed, exact names of hospitals, clinics, shelters, pharmacies, and the like), to ensure 
that no observations can potentially be directly linked to an individual or organization. 
 I respected anonymity by being conscientious of “presenting general information, 
not specific information” (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995) about the people observed as 
part of her study. Doing so would allow me to “develop [anecdotes] of individuals that 
represent a composite picture rather than an [isolated] picture” (Creswell 2013, 174). 
																																																								
9 I found this medium, while somewhat less “personable”, convenient. 
10 The extent of my responsibility was further outlined in consent forms submitted as part of my 
IRB submission packet for this project. 
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Preparing for data analysis 
I transcribed all five formal interview transcripts using a personalized mesh of 
naturalized and denaturalized transcription. While I did not pay strict attention to oratory 
style (e.g., notations related to speech), I did, however, note themes emergent in the 
informational/conversational content of the interview, the use of response/non-response 
tokens (e.g., “mhhm”), how and when words might have been used frequently (repeated). 
Practicing denaturalized transcription is commonplace among ethnographers (Agar 1996) 
and seemed likely to yield more fruitful thematic analyses (Fairclough 1993). 
Next, I developed a key wherein: a) anything underlined is considered an a priori 
code (words embedded in my research question/words I expect to come up in 
conversation) code; b) anything italicized is considered in vivo (words I have borrowed 
from my research participants) code; and c) anything bolded was considered a significant 
statement. In each transcript, I identified the codes present and performed thematic 
analysis of the ensuing data.  
Review the following selection from one transcript as an example.  
 
EXCERPT FROM INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT #2 
 
Gerpha (G): I’ll start with question one. What is your understanding of a peer support 
system, or a peer specialist? 
 
Interviewee (I): Well, I think it’s important to understand the idea of a peer in the first 
place. A peer, at least in the mental health/recovery movement, is someone with lived 
experience of significant and debilitating mental illness. Peers offer one another the 
shared wisdom of what it means to suffer from mental illness. The stigma is a big part 
of things and peers, in their comradery and support, help to fight against that.  
 
G: So, is a peer anyone willing to admit they have a form of mental illness? 
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I: It’s not that black-and-white. I won’t really get into the politics of who can say they’re 
really mentally ill or not because then we’d never get off the phone! (Interviewee 
laughs.) 
 
G: Right. 
 
I: But that’s what I’d in a nutshell describe a peer as. Someone who gets it from a 
personal vantage point. Not a social worker or therapist or psychiatrist—not saying that 
they can’t also be peers themselves…! 
 
G: Yes, such could be so. 
 
I: But a peer is like…a peer is someone who meets you where you’re at in your own 
recovery. Think of it almost in literal terms.  
 
G: Your peer at work is your colleague, not your boss. Your peer at school is a 
classmate—someone in the same grade—not necessarily your teacher. 
 
Emergent themes (aligned with what was bolded): 
• Lived experience as a form of expertise (knowledge) 
• Gerpha derailing her own interview. Must work on narrowing scope of 
questioning so that: a) questions are asked purposefully; b) Gerpha gets closer to 
amassing some answers to her overall research question. 
• Empathy as form of treatment (mutual aid) 
 
After exploring qualitative data analysis software, I felt most comfortable coding 
and analyzing my data by hand. For one, despite conducting a multi-field site study, I had 
a limited (relatively small) data set, and had completed the bulk of my analytical memos 
and notations either in index cards jutting out of my books, a notebook, or on the printed-
out copies of my interview transcripts. But my decision was mostly fueled by the desire 
to remain as “intimate” with my data as possible. Because the bulk of my reflections were 
excavated from personal writings, artwork, and hospital memorabilia, I wanted to 
continue in this vein of auto-mechanical documentation.  
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On performing a reflexive autoethnography 
 Of the many concepts I wrestled with when designing/conducting my fieldwork, 
perhaps the most tedious was my acquiescence to the terms “research subjects” and 
“research participants.” In conversations with a medical sociologist, I worried whether 
my being mentally ill would only impede, rather than inform, my research. Consider the 
following excerpt:  
Gerpha: […] Everything is connected, related. I feel like there’s so much I don’t know. If I 
knew more, I could ask more. I would know to ask about such and such or make 
connections between x and y. Like, how sick does someone have to be to be considered 
a peer? What’s the vetting process like, you know what I mean? 
 
Interviewee: Right. Vetting. I like that word.  
 
G: Am I more or less of a peer because I’m not currently hospitalized? Am I healthier, in 
that sense? Am I a superior peer, a super peer? I don’t feel pretty super at anything. 
 
 In large part, I wondered whether the term “research” could apply to my non-
traditional approach to health and health services research. What counts as research and 
what makes it credible is a topic rife with consternation within the academe (Rambo 
2007; Rambo 2007; Rambo 2011). My question had scantily measurable variables and 
my data was unlikely to yield reproducible results. I did not have a traditional field site, 
but instead a confluence of settings, past and present, in-person and indirect, that were 
under comparative observation. Given the introspective nature of my investigation, I did 
not immediately see myself as playing the role of a recruiter.  
 My “target research population”, or the peers encountered among the consumer 
advocacy support groups I participated in, were likely individuals I would have 
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encountered, by virtue of seeking out these groups to aid in my own recovery 
process, even if my thesis was not what it is. My transition to Boston, for example, meant 
that I would no longer be eligible for services at my once-local community health center 
and needed to rethink the logistics of my care. Even before the start of my first semester, 
I had phoned the group facilitator of the Framingham chapter of the HVN Network. And, 
upon leaving appointments with my new psychiatrist, I always made a point to hover near 
the lobby elevators in the SCFMHC, scanning the bulletin board for community updates.  
 So, while I sought out a specific group of people (those who self-identified as 
being mentally ill and/or having significant living impairments due to an embattled sense 
of mental wellbeing), I did not see myself as recruiting their company for empirical 
research, because I am not doing empirical research. I was not conducting formal 
interviews with any of the self-identified peers, despite spending several hours a week 
talking with them. Rather, I saw our interactions as a collective process of convalescence.  
 Still, I recognize that the decisions I made in, say, selecting the groups I wanted to 
conduct participant-observation in or even the times of day that I moderated online 
forums, were methodological choices that:  
• reflect a particular set of academic, intellectual, professional, financial, and 
personal commitments, and  
•  impact the kinds of information I would have been exposed to, even as a non-
researcher. 
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Challenges faced 
 Above anything, I wanted my project to be as minimally exploitative, yet 
“evidence-backed”, as possible. An unreliable narrator, according to literary theorist 
Gerald Prince, is one whose “norms and behavior are not in accordance with the implied 
author’s norms…” (Prince 1987, 101). While I conducted neither community-based 
participatory research nor a collaborative ethnography [in a formal methodological 
sense], I do realize that staking claim, or ownership, to stories [that are not necessarily 
“mine”] complicates the concept of authorship. I’m still unsure if I was successful in my 
endeavor. I also read just about anything I could on the ethics of autoethnographic work 
(Bruner 1993; Ellis 1995; Ellis 2007; Doloriert and Sambrook 2009; Roth 2009; 
Dauphinee 2010; Forber-Pratt 2015; Lapadat 2017).  
I also reviewed similarly phenomenological theses. These included: 
•  “Chronic illness and possible selves in the identity development process of 
midlife graduate students” (Robin Lee Jones, Fielding Graduate University, 
Department of Psychology) 
• “Whose story is it anyway?: Constructing the stories and pathology of 
madness/mental illness in the contemporary U.S.” (Claudia A. Rector, University 
of Maryland—College Park, Department of American Studies) 
• “The place of madness in American culture and discourse” (Margaret Cooke, 
University of Nevada—Reno, Program in English, Literature, and the 
Environment) 
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I often worried whether the sites I engaged were the “right” ones to conduct 
fieldwork in. This includes ensuring that the PSNs I’ve selected were characteristically 
suitable to the kinds of things I wanted to know in order to answer my research question. 
I also worried over whether my interview protocol included the “right” questions and if I 
had recruited the “best” potential interviewees.  
My largest obstacle was managing my productivity in relation to my health. My 
being disabled both influences and is, in part, the object of my inquiry. I have had several 
weeks where I’ve been too unwell to be productive. During this time, I’ve struggled with 
ways of making this time off productive/useful when the very thing that I am interested in 
researching is making it difficult for me to conduct research.  
Consider the following fieldnote excerpt:  
“I am nowhere near where I thought I would be. A large part of this reality 
frustrates me. But I am realizing that the frustration only makes me more 
symptomatic, which inevitably stalls some aspect of my work. This doesn’t mean 
I’ll snap my fingers and stop being upset at my shortcomings. Rather, I am trying 
to find ways to incorporate the “bad” into the proverbial good (AKA, research 
fodder, writing material, an impetus for making sure I pick the “right” program, a 
reason to pick up a paintbrush again)… (Gerlin, July 1, 2018)” 
 
Being ill myself has made me wary of the legitimacy and reliability of my claims 
as a researcher/knowledge contributor, a problem well-recognized in narratological 
inquiry as intrinsically ill-defined and paradoxical. Reviewing my own self-assessment of 
my progress remained imperative in staying motivated when underwhelmed and healthy 
when overwhelmed. 
Chronic self-reflection involved identifying and confronting triggers, as I did in 
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the following fieldnote: 
“I was not feeling well and largely triggered after being in the emergency 
room. (Gerlin, July 26, 2018)” 
And devising outlets with which to treat them: 
“Being in a hospital setting/in the ER again has inspired me to write 
something new. I don’t know if it will read more of as an academic essay 
or a vignette. I think I processed the experience from the third-person. I 
like the idea of submitting something to BU Today, but will have to 
review the submission guidelines its editor sent me. (Gerlin, July 26, 
2018)”  
 
 
 This process was paramount not only in getting myself out and into these 
communities, but also in willing myself to stay productive. This ranged from staying 
engaged and in contact with my interviewees, finishing my transcriptions, taking the bus 
to the library, and so on. 
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CHAPTER THREE: EXPLORING MENTAL ILLNESS PEERDOM 
 
 
This chapter troubles the notion/definition of a “peer.” 
 
What is a peer? 
 The Oxford English Dictionary provides two broad definitions for the term 
“peer.”11 The first refers to its derivatives in medieval lordship—a person of the same 
civil or ecclesiastical status or rank as the person in question; an equal before the law. 
The second definition seems more in-line with its use in the contemporary English 
lexicon—	a person who equals another in natural gifts, ability, or achievements; the 
equal in any respect of a person or thing. When I [and others interested in the lived 
experiences of the mentally ill and/or possibilities for recovery] use the word “peer”, it 
speaks to someone who has lived through [or is living with] mental illness(es)12, 
regardless of the nature of said condition(s).  
Given the complexity of the diagnostic process and inadequacies of prevalent 
treatment modalities, it is likely that said peer shares in experiences beyond the clinical. 
These might range from similar experiences of learning when/how to disclose one’s 
impairment/ability status to struggles of securing [and maintaining] steady employment. 
Beyond a similar structure within the disability narrative, a peer is also someone who 
“[has] experienced significant improvements in [his/her] psychiatric condition offering 
																																																								
11 As a noun. 
12 This includes substance use disorder/addiction.  
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services and/or supports to other people with serious mental illness who are considered to 
be not as far along in their own recovery process” (Davidson et al. 2006).  
 
Figure 5: “A Continuum of Helping Relationships Among Adults with Serious Mental 
Illness” (Davidson et al. 2006). 
 
Figure five depicts the idea of peer support as a median along a “a naturally occurring, bi-
directional and mutual relationship that evolves primarily in natural community settings” 
(Davidson et al. 2006).  
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At my first meeting with the leadership team of the MBRLC, I was emphatically 
reminded that everyone who walked through the basement doors13 is considered a peer. 
“We don’t ask too many questions,” one director remarked, “because we are a safe space 
for everyone living with mental health challenges.”  
I debated whether openness confirmed or compromised the idea of safety. Beyond 
the first-floor security check-point required of all visitors, penetrating this space was 
easy. While there was a lobby area, complete with front desk and peer receptionist, the 
sign-in sheet, at least the times it was visible, seemed too long for the few names 
scribbled atop. I remember, during my earlier visits, being stopped by a longstanding 
community member. He did not recognize me, and while this strangeness did not 
preclude me from participating in group or using the karaoke machine, he thought it wise 
to “just sign your name down here, sweetheart, just to be fair.” As I perused my backpack 
for a pen—the two pens they had up front did not work—he assured me (despite my not 
needing to be) that signing-in was “just the rules” and that “everybody, rain or shine, 
signs in.” I nodded and added my first name under the only other two signatures on the 
page—one, a set of initials and the other, a heart.  
The anonymity/openness so sanctified at the BRC was prevalent among all of the 
PSNs I studied. While some faces grew familiar, I never so much as learned more than 
the [first] names of six peers14—across all three networks. Acknowledging one another 
																																																								
13 The “basement doors” here refers to the basement doors of the SCFMHC, located at 85 East 
Newton Street. This site was property of the Department of Mental Health. The BRC, a member 
organization of the MBRLC, occupies the building’s basement level.  
14 These six peers exclude the leadership team of the respective network/group support meetings.  
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came as simply as gesturing to the last speaker or using assumed gender pronouns (eg, 
“S/he said). Healing15 as a possibility for the chronically mentally ill, who have grown 
familiarized to a certain kind of existence is further troubled by the idea that words like 
“recovery” and “convalescence” are elements of ritual healing characterized by an 
“incremental efficacy” (Csordas 1997, 72).  Attendance was neither required nor ever 
mentioned—that I recall—at any of the group support meetings I attended. Identifying 
yourself and legitimizing your reasons for being there were rarely, if ever, an issue. How 
well dressed or well-spoken the person sitting next to me appeared never made me 
question the reliability of their stories. There were no sickness verification forms—no 
mandates for meeting a particular quota of medications prescribed or suicide attempts. 
One’s willing presence, it seemed, sufficed.  
The same applies to Mental Illness Mouse. Moderators rotate frequently.16 While 
I have been moderating the site for about three years, I know my fellow moderators only 
by either a nickname or screen name.17 I have never so much as sent any of them a text. 
Our most extensive communications have either been over e-mail and/or Skype. Both 
occasions are usually the result of either conducting moderator interviews or deciding 
how/if to report violent threats.  
A distinction should be made between the reciprocal nature of sharing [and 
finding some sense of solidarity or purpose] in each other’s suffering and the role, or 
																																																								
15 The therapeutic efficacy of PSNs. 
16 The platform opens applications at least once every three months.  
17 This is not to suggest that none of the moderators, either during my three years with the 
platform or prior to my membership, have ever developed more extensive relationships. I only 
mean that this has not been my experience.  
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obligation, that peers have to positively contribute to another’s wellbeing. I find it 
helpful, albeit somewhat problematic and reductionist, to think of the former as someone 
actively accessing services, and the latter as someone who, while still ill, provides said 
services. Both are consumers of mental health services. Still the latter, what disabled 
disability studies scholar Tanya Titchkosky describes as the “able-disabled”, has a formal 
title—certified peer specialist. And with this confirmation comes complications.  
A certified peer specialist, however, means different things under different 
circumstances. The qualifier “certified” denotes a particular kind of value on validating 
said peer’s peer-qualifications. The certification varies regionally and intra-
professionally. Peer specialists are a curiously qualified workforce that leverages their 
lived experience with mental illness—what is widely considered an impairment as 
opposed to a skillset. Certified peer specialists are employable peers. They have 
undergone a certain level of training [both by senior peer specialists and licensed 
behavioral healthcare providers] and/or passed an examination. Eligibility requirements 
for the certified peer specialist training at the Transformation Center18 vary from that of, 
say, the national nonprofit Mental Health America.19 The former requires prospective 
participants to be Massachusetts residents of legal age with a GED equivalent. The latter 
requires: 
• Prior state certification. Not all states require or have a system in place for 
																																																								
18 The Transformation Center is a member organization of the Central Massachusetts Recovery 
Learning Community, primarily providing technical support assistance to sister sites.  
19 This nonprofit was founded by Clifford Beers, luminary behind the American mental hygiene, 
movement and author of the illness narrative A Mind that Found Itself. 
  
45 
certifying specialists. In such cases, a training requirement, minimum of 40 hours, 
pre-approved by Mental Health America, is its substitute. Currently, the 
organization recognizes eight nationally approved trainings.  
•  3,000 hours of either paid or supervised volunteer peer support experience within 
six years of the National Certified Peer Specialist examination 
• Two letters of recommendation—one professional, one supervisory 
• Passing all six domains of the National Certified Peer Specialist examination: 
Foundations of Peer Support; Foundations of Healthcare Systems; Mentoring, 
Shared Learning, and Relationship Building; Activation and Self-Management; 
Advocacy; and Professional and Ethical Responsibilities 
And while the Transformation Center does not use training as a certified peer 
specialist as a prerequisite for giving support, all peers who work at any Mental 
Health America affiliate hold certification.  
 All of the group support moderators I engaged in-person with claimed to be 
certified, though I never bothered to follow-up on the extent of their qualifications. While 
the decision to require certification of peers in Massachusetts is left up to individual 
behavioral healthcare agencies, it seems that agencies are leaning towards standardized 
certification. During one meeting at the BRC, one peer expressed disappointment over 
the trend in required training. “It’s getting so hard, too hard, to just do what we said we 
were gonna do in the first place,” she’d lamented. When asked by the leading peer 
specialist to elaborate, the woman continued: “I mean, it’s like fucking20 school. I 																																																								
20 The woman was swiftly reprimanded for using an expletive, since such language is considered 
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finished school. I didn’t think I needed to school myself on my own life or mental health. 
It’s like—I live it, okay? What am I supposed to do?—take classes on my own life? Who 
knows it better than me, anyway?” 
  These frustrations are embedded within larger concerns over the value of 
subjectivity as experience/evidence. Gone were the days—or so it seemed—of the feel-
goods that motivated the 1970s mutual aid movement. Where there was once an emphasis 
on “experiencing an empathic and compassionate witness” (Watts & Higgins 2016, 
124)—it appeared—a push to better regulating the knowledge production pool of 
peerdom. Revisiting the term “able-disabled” is useful in examining how the 
personal/subjective is countered/delegitimized., especially in contexts of illness 
performativity.  
What counts as experience—certainly experience worthy enough to render one 
“certified”—speaks to a larger issue of passing and compulsory neurotypicality/able-
bodiedness. While everyone who passes through the BRC may be welcomed as a peer, 
those who can demonstrate enough “advancement” or progress in their recovery are seen, 
and treasured, for being “truer” peers, better peers, peers whose “impairments have been 
rationalized as positive attributes” (Grue 2015).  
 The more flexible one’s illness performativity can be, the more impressive s/he is 
as a disabled person. And the certified peer specialists, I think, are valued for meandering 
the lines between being sick enough to gain trust, but well enough to not be disabled. 
That disability connotes stigma informs the assumptions that people make, and impose 
																																																								
obscene and violates the BRC’s code of group conduct.  
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upon, disabled people. The logic, generally, is as follows: If someone is sick, s/he likely 
can’t do much for him/herself. And if s/he can’t take care of him/herself—the most inane 
and essential of obligations— then how the heck can I expect him/her to be able to take 
on xyz?  
 I shared these concerns with a recent clinical social worker graduate, who was 
now working for a social services organization. When I asked her for her perspective on 
the trend towards standardizing/hierarchizing experience, she laughed: 
 “Well, I just did the same thing myself, Gerpha. That’s what you call a Master’s 
degree. It may seem like an awkward process, but we need that.” 
 “That?” I repeated, prodding for elaboration. 
 “Yeah. We need experts. And having a piece of paper or some kind of credentials 
lets people know that you know what you’re talking about. It’s not just a status thing. It’s 
out of necessity.” 
 “So how do certified peers fulfill needs at the BRC?” 
 “Well, it’s kinda like—I mean…” This was our third interview and, although we 
were still new to one another, I knew enough about her [or general human 
communication patterns] to realize that she was not being forthright. I sensed her pauses 
and stops had less to do with her being nervous. 
 “Sara21, what do you want to say?”  
 “I don’t want to be mean or disrespectful, but it’s like—how can you not have 
some kind of hierarchy? Otherwise, who would be in charge?” 
																																																								
21 Pseudonym. 
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 “Well, these networks champion the idea of self-determ—” 
 “Yeah, [self-determination]. I’m a social worker, and I know what that is and all, 
but still. You need…without the distinction, I guess you just have a bunch of people with 
these insane problems, sitting around in a circle. And like, without some kind of 
overhead, how do you expect them to help themselves?”  
 “Peer”, as an identity marker, is employed across both personal and professional 
contexts. The idea/role of a peer can be separated into: a peer companion (someone with 
whom one shares a mutuality (in this case, the phenomenon of chronic mental illness)); a 
peer specialist (someone whose lived experience has been (however arbitrarily) vetted, 
and can be leveraged for payment [as a form of labor]. Group facilitators would fall in 
this category.); and a peer leader. The nuanced difference between the latter two lies in 
recognition.  
 Several community health/behavioral healthcare agencies (like Vinfen, Baycove, 
and Bridgewell22) employ people because of their lived experiences with mental illness. 
Or, as one certified peer remarked: “They want me because I’m fucked up. Seriously! I 
mean, I know it sounds like, what?...But it’s because of who I am and what I go 
through—that’s why I can do this job. That’s why they wanted me.”  
 I thought it best not to suggest that the practice of hiring someone based on who 
s/he is is not unique to peer specialists. While some employers claim to practice a holistic 
vetting process, eligibility requirements are included, and prioritized, for a reason. What 
this specialist perhaps meant, however, is that, within the context of peerdom, her health 
																																																								
22 Examples of social services agencies. 
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impediments were less disabling. They were assets, as opposed to being just a “pain all 
the time in [my] fucking ass, you know?” 
 In such cases, the peer role transforms from companion to employee. I am unsure 
of the correlation, if any, between how performative (or inspirationally ill) one’s peerdom 
is and his/her pay/benefits. This shift is also accompanied by a tilted power hierarchy. For 
example, the MBRLC refers to its members as “peers.” Both terms are used liberally in 
marketing materials. There are at least two organizations within the MBRLC that include 
“peer” in their names. Yet the BRC refers to its participants23 as “community members.” 
 Despite claims of a “model…of equality” (MetroBostonRLC.org), the playing 
field is anything but. Peers like myself are considered volunteers among the BRC 
community members. While welcome, we are primarily visitors. I, for example, am 
always the youngest face present. I am relatively new, and with my backpack and BU 
identification, am also visibly privileged. I am one of the few peers who doesn’t live 
either in the SCFMHC or some kind of subsidized/supported housing facility.  
 There are peers whose experiences living with chronic mental illness position 
them in a higher stage within the peer/consumer advocacy sphere. These would include 
all co-directors of the BRC (who report to BMC Psychiatry), the MBRLC’s Director of 
Recovery Programs, the chair of its board, the group facilitators of the Alternatives to 
Suicide group, and the like. These peers are expected to be in a phase of their recovery 
that allows them to oversee the convalescence journeys of others.  
																																																								
23 By virtue of the BRC being a division of the larger MBRLC, the terminology related to peers is 
relatively consistent. The MBRLC’s peers, then, are synonymous to the BRC’s term, “community 
member.” 
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 Asking what a peer is begets additional questions surrounding the “true” nature of 
mental illness and whether peers are suffering from real, discernible illness at all, or 
something else altogether. “Mental illness” is not a term favored by the BRC. Peers here 
experience challenges or persistent difficulties related to their mental health, but they 
don’t widely use words like “ill”, “sick”, or “suffer.” Community members there prefer 
mental health challenges, though I am inclined to believe the terms are synonymous.  
 
Conclusion 
 The “body as specimen” model, writes bioethicist Nora Jones, is a consequence of 
the medical encounters that shape healthcare, its practitioners, and its consumers. It 
emerges, perhaps most explicitly, in medical school curricula, whereby students adopt a 
linguistic finesse in describing “what is [most] important about patients” (Jones 2011, 
75). The patient’s medical history [made tangible via a system of rigorous record-
keeping] is transforms from a repository of data into “a tool of the emerging methods of 
scientific management, a sociomaterial apparatus, in which everyone from hospital 
administrators, billing departments, and medical records librarians are implicated” (Berg 
& Harterink 2004). This purposeful distillation of person into patient, or, “the body into 
test results, specialized images, and disease labels” (Jones 2011, 75) speaks to a larger 
valorization of how people have been reduced to the individual sum of their body parts, 
rendered interpretable only by healthcare practitioners within the context of a “specially 
and technologically mediated clinical” (Jones 2011, 77) setting.  
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 What I have examined within these PSNs suggests a shift from specimenization 
toward examining the body in the context of illness, directly from the perspective of 
“patient-hood.” Jones understands this body, in difference to that of medical tool or 
public spectacle, as one whereby it is best accessed by “the stories patients themselves 
tell” (Jones 2011, 80). The anthropologist Byron Good demonstrates, in his analysis of 
symbolization and power, how illness narratives—the stories people tell about the kinds 
of things that ail them—harken upon an initial diagnostic reveal. This framing story, he 
argues, “sets the stage for the understanding of what and how illness has happened to the 
patient” (Good 1994).  
 This is not to suggest, for instance, that the peers I have engaged with only came 
to know themselves as ill or dis-eased by way of interfacing with the psycho-medical-
legal systems—despite the nature of these interactions being both dramatic and 
deterministic. Rather, the dis-eased body—by way of being visible in one [clinical] 
context—is capable of then being un-and-“re”-seen—re-lived, re-interpreted, re-
written—in new ways by the same patient/peer. Diagnostic processes, Jones notes, are 
not a siloed reflection of “of what the practitioner sees in her tests and examinations, but 
an invocation for the patient of new ways of thinking of oneself and of being in the 
world, the author of that symbolization holds immense power over the worldview and 
identity of the patient” (Jones 2011, 81).  
 The importance of engaging both patients and their own prescribed narratives is 
only revealed once it is realized that the stories are not “just” about illness; they are 
stories about illness explicated through an ill body/by an ill person (Frank 1995). Patient 
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narratives, Jones notes, “reclaim the personal voice that was lost when illness narrative 
became medical story” (Jones 2011, 82). This process of narrativization, or, how symbols 
are made sense of and integrated into a particular worldview, are a consequence of 
patients demanding to speak, as people, as opposed to being spoken for (Jones 2011, 82).  
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CHAPTER FOUR: EXAMINING PEER SUPPORT NETWORKS 
 
This chapter structurally relates the PSNs by analyzing material culture pertinent 
to each network. 
 
A philosophy of “PSNs” 
 My understanding of PSNs is broadly three-fold. A PSN: 
• Is an abstraction of perpetual experience and functions as a “space of 
possibilities” (Ratcliffe 2008, 101) 
• Appeals to the “existential phenomenology of illness” (Van den Berg 1966), or, 
the case of the chronic patient, whom I have come to understand as a sort of 
“non”-person. The “non”-person’s experiences, by some consequence of both 
bodily impairment and social disability, are characterized by “[…] a particular 
feeling of non-participation…” (Van den Berg 1966, 28; Ratcliffe 2008, 117) that 
becomes one’s sole life-awareness: 
“I have ceased to belong; I have no part of it. […] The world has shrunk to 
the size of my bedroom, or rather my bed” (Van den Berg 1966, 26-7; 
Ratcliffe 2008, 117). 
• Offers a way of “being in the world” (Heidegger 1962; Dreyfus 1991) that 
replaces a loss of practical non-belonging (Ratcliffe 2008, 64)24 
																																																								
24 In essence, being both in and of the world, or recognized as a full member as opposed to a 
peripheral participant.  
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Structuring the BRC 
 The BRC is one of five-member organizations of the MBRLC. The MBRLC 
imagines itself as “a wagon wheel with [itself] as the hub, with different resource centers 
and other programs and services as the spokes” (MetroBostonRLC.org). Although a 
consortium, each Center, within each Recovery Learning Community, functions 
somewhat autonomously. Each Center holds different hours, offers different kinds of 
support groups, is staffed by specialists with various education and training credentials, 
and so on. Whereas the BRC, for instance, boasts gym access and a computer lab, the 
Peer Education Resource Center, focuses on workshops relevant to job training. Boston 
Medical Center—in contract with the state Department of Mental Health—serves as its 
fiscal agent.  
The BRC is located within the Boston University Medical Campus complex, 
though it is housed specifically within state property, the SCFMHC. Its three co-
executive directors and handful of certified peer specialists are considered employees of 
Boston Medical Center’s Department of Psychiatry.  
Descriptions of the BRC’s services and activities are advertised on its website, as 
well as via brochures, flyers, and monthly calendars plastered on building bulletin boards.  
As part of my participant-observation, I engaged in the morning-check ins and noon 
support meetings. Morning check-ins were sometimes held in the kitchen, where peers—
mostly residents of Ward 5C of the SCFMHC—enjoyed unrestricted access to free 
coffee, teas, cold water, and the occasional bag of chips. Although every psychiatric ward 
is different, I remember having to practically beg for a snack whenever I was 
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hospitalized. The BRC, with its paint-chipped walls and stained furniture, was different. 
It was, somehow, better…surprisingly so.  
Given that the kitchen had a roof, a soft place to sit, and reliable heating and 
cooling, peers—especially those who were used to sleeping at bus stops—often tried 
using this space as a means of “resting [my] eyes to get rid of the old day.” This “resting” 
of the eyes, what one specialist described as “rude”, was expressly forbidden.  
My jokingly asking if the snores were too unbearable earned a reprimand from a 
peer specialist. “Sleeping the day away isn’t going to make them any better. You have to 
be awake if you want to recover.”  
“And what happens if they’re detoxing or—or just plain old tired?” I asked. 
“We offer them more coffee!” Although the specialist said this with a smile, it 
seemed marred.  
She continued, cutting her eyes slightly, “We’re not in the business of sleeping. 
We are in the business of getting better. Doing better. Anyway, you sleep better when 
you feel better. And you can’t work on your feelings with your eyes closed. At least, I 
know I can’t.” 
The “work” of recovery seemingly happens in the form of group support 
meetings. A more structured group, led by a member of the Greater Boston Consumer 
Advocacy Network, took place Monday mornings. Given that this group was outsourced, 
it came with its own specialist, group comfort agreement, and participation format. I 
more often participated in Wednesdays’ and Thursdays’ post-lunch support meetings. 
These meetings, intended especially for peers who “lived with”, not suffered from, co-
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morbid, or dual mental health concerns. The number of peers who attended the Center 
could vary—and do so significantly—daily. On occasions where the demand for said 
meeting was lower, specialists would retrofit the topic to the needs of the peers present 
that day. The group comfort agreement, however, was static. I have reproduced it (from a 
handout received in December 2017) below: 
Group Comfort Agreement  
• Please wait until others are done speaking before leaving the  
group.  
• We agree to disagree.  
• Please use an “I” statement when giving advice.  
• Please maintain confidentiality- what is said in the room remains  
in the room.  
• In the interest of safety, we must seek outside assistance if we believe someone 
may harm themselves or someone else. Anyone may “pass” if they would not like to 
share, and no one will force anyone to share.  
• Say “ouch” if you find language is triggering or too graphic.  
• We ask that cell phones are silenced and not used during group. You may leave 
and return if you want to make a phone call.  
 
While working towards one’s recovery was expected/required, participation, or at 
least in the ways I was familiar, varied. Peers were allowed—and sometimes did—
shuffle, silently, from meeting to meeting, seat to seat. There were times that, even in a 
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room full of faces, only two would speak…for the entire hour that that particular group 
met. Listening, not for one’s turn to speak, but as a form of companionship, I soon 
realized, was an important—if not one of the most important—tenet(s) of recovery.  
So many of these peers, it seemed, had been denounced as patients/people on the 
“Outside.” Their existence had been pathologized, marginalized, and debased. Their 
voices, in many spheres, went unheard. As one peer once cried: “Nobody listens to me, 
not even when I’m screaming. I mean, I could be crying, hysterical in bed, and the lady 
next to me just rolls over. Almost nobody listens. How are they supposed to help if they 
don’t even know my problem? If they listened, they could understand. But nobody 
listens; no social listens; no doctor listens; no place listens.” The Center, however, was 
not one of them.  
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Figure 6: Sample calendar.  
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One-on-one services include peer bridgers and the peer support line. Peer, or 
“community”, bridgers, function as peers who use their lived experience with the 
consequences of mental health “issues”25 to support fellow peers in transition from 
institutional settings –“whether being discharged from the hospital, jail, or other 
situations” (MetroBostonRLC.org). 
The peer-directed hotline operates daily from 4pm to 8pm Eastern Standard Time 
(MetroBostonRLC.org).26 A Spanish-speaking person staffs the line twice a week. It 
serves Massachusetts residents, though has partnered with WarmLine, a call-service 
directory, to facilitate out-of-state needs. The BRC’s website describes its peer support 
line as a “a compassionate community telephone service, staffed by Operators who have 
lived experience with mental health issues.”  
An Operator is to: 
• “provide a supportive ear to callers who want to share their thoughts and feelings 
about life and its challenges with a person who also has lived experience” 
• be able to “suggest various community resources to each caller that may provide 
additional services and support” 
• “provide local, state and national resources to assist callers in their recovery” 
 
																																																								
25 Remember that the terms “mental illness” or “psychiatric illness are prohibited by the BRC.  
26 Exceptions are updated both via print resources (eg, the monthly calendars) and through an 
automated recording.  
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Figure 7: Peer/community bridgers’ expertise (via MetroBostonRLC.org). 
 
Reiterated throughout both the website and my interactions with an Operator is 
the medicinal property of hope. By being “better”, or, in an advanced stage of 
convalescence/recovery, Operators function as a tangible symbol of hope.  
“People need hope in order to survive, even if they don’t live through the same 
mental health challenges that we do,” one Operator explained. She continued: “I could be 
sitting here at this desk tomorrow and call-out tod—Oh, you know what I mean!...The 
point is that things change. Life is up and down. But the one thing that keeps people 
balanced is hope. It’s like our, you know, it’s like a kind of medicine.”  
When I asked about her training in administering said medicine, she laughed: 
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“Life. Nobody can teach what I live through. Feeling stuck. Feeling like an alien, like I 
didn’t belong, not even in my own body. When I’m at my lowest, I just have to hope that 
it won’t—it can’t—get any worse. I just have to.”  
“And is hope the magic pill?” I wondered aloud.  
She paused, then shook her head. “I don’t think there is one. I mean, I’m human, 
and I walk through what I walk through…we all need help, and that goes for anybody.” 
Later that day after karaoke, I asked a peer who frequently used the peer support 
line, especially on days when it was impossible, or “too hard to make it here in person”, 
about her perceptions of the service. 
“So,” I began, “the big take-away is that this gives you hope?” 
“Yeah. Whenever we hang-up, I feel better. It’s like free therapy!” she laughed. 
“How does hope help you?” At the puckering of her eyebrows, I added: “I 
mean—what is it about these phone calls that makes your life a little easier?” 
“I mean, it’s hope. Hope is hope, you know?” 
I waited a few minutes for her to elaborate. 
“It’s like—yeah, I don’t even know the person I’m sitting here telling my whole 
business to, but, like, that doesn’t matter. They know me, you know? They’re a peer, too. 
And instead of sitting in some home, they’re at a desk. In a real place. They’re on the 
other side.” 
“Literally.”  
We laughed, and she nodded, before adding: “They may still have mental health 
challenges, but they’re better. Getting better. And that makes me hope I can be the same 
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way.” 
 “Does hoping for the better work as well as, say, an anti-psychotic? Like 
Latuda?” I prodded. 
“Sometimes. Yes and no. Being hopeful is free and doesn’t give me any weird 
side effects.” 
“Does it lessen your sympt—sorry, the negative feelings and thoughts you have?” 
“N-no, not always. But it helps me. And I’m not saying there’s anything bad with 
taking medications—there are peers here, including myself, who take them. Psych-ia-
tro—psych—mental drugs, you know?” 
“Okay.” 
“They help some people. But for some people they only make things worse. Hope 
doesn’t hurt anyone.” 
“Say you get well enough to do what they’re doing—staffing the peer support 
lines.” 
 “Uh-huh.” 
 “Is hope the answer to every caller’s question?” 
 “I mean, it’s one thing to be hopeful, but I mean, with some of these calls—I 
mean, it will affect me, you know? I mean, I think I can do what they do. Try to connect 
people to resources and make them feel like they will get be-better, like…they will get 
out of that shelter and into their own apartment. They will get that subsidy. Like, they will 
get out of that abusive relationship alive.” 
“Okay. Will that always be enough? Is “hope” the answer?” 
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“I mean—I, I guess I never really—I mean, it’s obvious, right?” 
“Not to me.” 
“Right, I mean, yeah, I 1000 percent believe in hope and I try to stay hopeful so I 
can lift myself up and get better. But it can be so hard, for us all, to be hopeful. Like, 
sometimes it’s hard—really, really, hard—just to even try.” 
“Right. No medication comes without its complications, I suppose.” 
 
Structuring the A2S group support meetings 
I first learned of the A2S group while conducting participant-observation at the 
BRC. While peering at the artwork along the kitchen walls—all peer-contributed—I 
stumbled upon a nearby taped flyer. I don’t think “suicide” is a word that doesn’t turn 
heads. But that the word “suicide” was so publicly emblazoned—especially in a place 
where the words “clinical depression” caught whiplash—hit me. Hard.  
“You should check it out, Geriffa27,” one peer suggested. So fixated was I by this 
infographic I lost sight of when he neared my side. Closely. I took a step back before I 
responded, or we would have been close enough to kiss.  
“It’s a cool space, cool folks. It’s…”  
With his hands funneling through his pockets, he nodded to the rest of the room, 
mostly empty, before continuing.  
“Different.” 
																																																								
27 Save for two members of the leadership team, no one at the BRC has ever pronounced my 
name correctly. 
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“Different how? Isn’t it part of the Western Mass—” 
“Yeah, but every RLC is different. It’s just…different. But I like it. I like going to 
different ones, for different reasons. I like the BRC, but…” he shrugged before nodding, 
almost as if to assure himself of what came next: 
 “They just…different people fulfill different needs. I mean, check out DBSA28, 
AA29, all of—And let’s just say…they’ve fulfilled my greatest need of all.” 
 I was sure he meant that this group/peers at this particular recovery learning 
community supplanted him with a will to live in ways different, or impossible, for the 
BRC. I also figured he was stumbling over himself in an effort to not discredit their work. 
 “When was the last time you went to a group meeting? It’s all the way in 
Somerville; that place just sounds far!” I chuckled—mostly because it seemed like the 
convivial thing to do. I leave my bedroom typically out of necessity, not to explore. I had, 
up until then, been without reason to go to Somerville. I soon realized, though, that 
tomorrow was as good a day as any. It was, according to the infographic, the group’s 
first-time meeting at this new Somerville location. 
 “Nowhere is out of reach when you’re trying to—” He started, though stopped, 
when he caught his voice raising. I took another step back when I noticed his fists 
clenched. 
 “I mean…what did you say? Or ask me?” 
 “When was the last time you went?” 
																																																								
28 Depression-Bipolar Support Alliance. The nearest one, that I knew of, was in Belmont, MA—
just a stone’s throw from McLean hospital. 
29 Alcoholics Anonymous. 
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 “The same day I last tried to kill myself.” 
 I snapped a picture of the graphic and confirmed travel instructions. We went our 
separate ways after then. I have not seen him since, neither at the BRC nor the A2S 
group. Although I knew what others called him, I did not know his name, and thus could 
never be sure that I was asking for/about the right person. It’s policy to retain the privacy 
of peers, one peer shared. “Your business is yours if you want to keep it that way. People 
come and go all the time. We welcome everyone, but we don’t force anyone to stay.” 
And how could they? People have a right to “be missing” if they so choose.  
 In 2008, the WMRLC developed the A2S group as a “peer-to-peer support 
approach” (WesternMassRLC.org; Sorenson & Donovan 2013; Burke & Bryant 2016) to 
affirming suicidality and self-harm as tangible consequences of living with mental health 
challenges. The group prides itself on giving sufferers “the opportunity to talk openly 
about suicide and feelings of deep emotional distress with others who have or are 
experiencing similar struggles” (WesternMassRLC.org).  
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Figure 8: Slide from presentation by Advocacy Unlimited, a recovery-based nonprofit in 
Connecticut.  
 
 
The A2S group charter is based on similar core values of openness and agency. 
This Community’s facilitators, similarly to the BRC’s certified peer specialists, publicly 
identify and present themselves as living—and suffering—with “deep distress.” 
Attendance and participation are subject only to personal discretion. “The group,” the 
charter reads, “[is open to]…people…for as long as it suits them.”  
 
  
67 
 Figure 9: Excerpt from first page of A2S group charter30.  
 
 
A significant difference between the BRC and this group, however, is the 
abstraction of the concept of “services.” While both networks value the individual 
sufferer experience as a kind of expertise, the latter does not leverage said expertise over 
the newness of someone else’s. No one, for instance, wears identifying badges during 
these groups, not even the facilitators. Their being employed by the WMRLC sits behind 
their identifying, first and foremost, as suicidal. No one—especially not the group’s 
																																																								
30 Scanned with permission. 
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facilitators—is seen as a service provider. The group does not render, nor does any one 
participant receive, services.   
 
 
Figure 10: One of Western Massachusetts’s Recovery Learning Community’s core 
values and defining principles. 
 
 While the group boasts an atmosphere that can foster recovery, the real work, they 
believe, happens within: 
“The RLC will not preach any one way of healing and will make space for people 
to define their own paths to ‘recovery.’ This means that the RLC will offer education and 
information on a variety of perspectives, options and resources, but that people will 
always hold the power to determine their own goals, and to define for themselves the 
meaning of the word ‘recovery’ as it applies to their own lives” (WesternMassRLC.org). 
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Linguistic decisions 
 Like the BRC, no one A2S group participant seems to be mentally ill. At least, not 
in a clinical sense. Participants across both networks are discouraged from using 
clinically-aligning language (like schizophrenic or manic). To remain respectful, the 
Western Massachusetts Recovery Learning Center “encourages [participants] to use 
open, person-first, strengths-based language and to avoid using one-word labels when 
referring to others in the recovery community” (WesternMassRLC.org).  
While I am perplexed by person-first language and rely on clinically-aligning 
language to describe myself, I realize this is not—and does not have to be—a universal 
case. Avoiding the use of said language—and clinical/colloquial terms like “crazy” and 
“lunatic”—altogether bothered me. I, for example, talk about myself as a disabled or a 
mentally ill person. To me, these qualifiers aren’t a burdensome preface—they function, 
in some contexts, as both adjective and noun. I do not see myself as a person with a 
disability. My disability does not—has not—granted me such a distinction.31 
Below, however, are blog excerpts from self-identifying disabled people on the 
problematic consequences of person-first language: 
 “In the disability world, it is not unusual to hear the expression, ‘See the person, 
not the disability.’ I rather cringe at this construction — in the same way that I rather 
cringe when people talk about colorblindness and race. Why this insistence on ignoring 
what is palpably there? Why ignore any attribute of a human being? The idea that one has 
																																																								
31 I will not engage identity politics much further in this project, largely because I am not 
comfortably prepared to do so. 
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to choose between seeing the person and seeing the disability has never made a lot of 
sense to me. My response has been to reframe it as follows: 
See BOTH the person AND the disability. Because there is nothing dehumanizing 
or shameful about a disability. 
My rewriting speaks to the heart of the problem with person-first language and its 
insistence on turns of phrase like “person with disabilities” rather than the identity-first 
language of “disabled person.” Such language betrays the assumption that disability 
renders one less of a person. If that assumption were not present, there would be no 
reason to foreground the fact that we really, really, really are people, and that one has to 
put the disability aside in order to see how really, really, really human we are” (Rachel 
Cohen-Rottenberg, 2015, via TheBodyisNotanApology.com). 
* 
“When we say “person with autism,” we say that it is unfortunate and an accident 
that a person is Autistic. We affirm that the person has value and worth, and that autism 
is entirely separate from what gives him or her value and worth. In fact, we are saying 
that autism is detrimental to value and worth as a person, which is why we separate the 
condition with the word “with” or “has.” Ultimately, what we are saying when we say 
“person with autism” is that the person would be better off if not Autistic, and that it 
would have been better if he or she had been born typical. We suppress the individual’s 
identity as an Autistic person because we are saying that autism is something inherently 
bad like a disease” (Lydia Brown, 2011, via AutisticHoya.net). 
* 
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“Though person-first language is designed to promote respect, the concept is 
based on the idea that disability is something negative, something that you shouldn’t want 
to see. After all, no one tells me that I should call myself a person with femaleness or a 
person with Jewishness. I’m a Jewish woman. No one questions that. Yet when I dare to 
call myself a disabled person, it seems the whole world turns upside down. That’s 
because gender and religion are seen as neutral, if not positive, characteristics. The idea 
of separating the disability from the person stems from the idea that disability is 
something you should want to have separated from you, like a rotten tooth that needs to 
be pulled out” (Cara Liebowitz, 2015, via TheBodyisNotanApology.com). 
 
To compromise, I only used this language when referring to my stories or beliefs 
about myself. If anyone took issue, it was never explicit. 
  
Structuring the Hearing Voices group support meetings  
 The HVN network derived from the United Kingdom’s HVN. Both formulations 
“aim to provide safe environments where people feel accepted and less isolated in their 
experiences [of hearing voices]” (Dillon & Hornstein 2013; Oakland & Berry 2014, 119). 
Akin to the networks I presented prior, Hearing Voices groups value individual 
experience as expertise and use this expertise to encourage voice-hearers to adopt active 
roles in facilitating discussion around the source, utility, and importance of said voices. 
While, like the recovery learning communities, the HVN offered education and training 
opportunities, it seemed as an afterthought. Out of all of the networks I participated in, 
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Hearing Voices seemed the least concerned with defining group/leader parameters.32 
When I asked about the group comfort agreement or group charter, for example, I was 
told (unsure of by whom) there was none. 
 
 
Figure 11: FAQ page.33  
 
“Really?” I was skeptical. Maybe I had asked the wrong person? Surely the group 
facilitator would have one. They’re bound to. They’re trained to. If only I could find 
one… 																																																								
32 This is not to suggest that, in doing so, they are less efficient or less valuable than other 
networks. Indeed, several peers who attended the BRC or the A2S Group knew of the 
organization. 
33 This is the sole question listed (HearingVoicesUSA.org). 
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 “Really. You can check out the website if you want more information34, but we go 
off our own thing here.” 
 “What does that mean?” 
 “We assume people will be respectful and open-minded. It’s the right thing to do. 
And, for some folks here, it’s all we can ask of.” 
A key difference between the former and Hearing Voices is the accepted 
ambiguity around recovery as an intended outcome. As both concept and action, the 
contextual definition of “recovery”/“recovering” from mental illness is problematic 
(Davidson et al. 2005; Davidson & Roe 2009; Boutillier et al. 2011).35 
 I got the impression that voice-hearing was not something by default to rid 
oneself of, but instead something that should, in consideration with other decisions, be 
understood. The desire to listen—to each other and to oneself—was key. I attended 
meetings at the Framingham chapter, which met on the ground floor of a church. I was 
surprised, though not entirely off-put, by how long the first meeting was. Perhaps more 
telling, though, was that no one else seemed to be. The church—the group—seemed too 
good, for some, to leave. As the sky darkened, several teenage girls kicked off their shoes 
and cracked their toes. 
The hallway lights dimmed as church employees left their offices. A white-haired 
man whipped out a blanket from his purse. Two out of the twelve people in the room 
																																																								
34 Hearing Voices support groups do not require peers to be certified, though they recognize that 
many people interested in alternatives to contemporary group therapies will come to the 
organization having been exposed to extensive standardized trainings. 
35 I am unsure of both how I feel about and how to describe “recovery.” To avoid 
confusing/conflating the term, I have avoided using it. 
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were—had been—asleep for at least half the meeting. They were curled up against each 
other, teetering on the edge of a loveseat. No one seemed bothered enough to wake them, 
not even as the meeting finally ended—two-and-a-half hours past time. I found myself 
lingering by the door after most had found their way above ground. I was too nervous to 
leave, worried that these folks would get locked in. After expressing my concern to one 
of the facilitators, he laughed and laughed. It startled me, not because of how it echoed, 
but because it was the first laugh I had heard all day. It was booming, noisy even. I 
resisted the temptation of covering my ears. I was new. I did not want to seem rude. 
“Trust me, you can bet on this—getting locked in here wouldn’t be a problem for them! 
They’ve been coming here for months. This is probably as homey as it gets for those 
girls.” He winked before putting a hand on my shoulder and gesturing to a large cross 
adorning a back wall. “And it’s not because of that, either.” 
I thought as much. As he waved goodnight, I remembered the peers who had 
trouble “resting” their eyes to get rid of the old days. I wondered whether they were 
rested enough to recover. And when these girls were absent from the next few meetings, I 
wondered if they were, too. 
 
Conclusion 
I have come to understand PSNs as a kind of speculatively clinical/therapeutic 
borderland. Borderland theory, as imagined by Chicana anthropologist Gloria Anzaldúa, 
suggests that borders exist not only on a geographical plane, but, perhaps are born from 
an epistemic territoriality. We might consider peers as “nepantleras/os” (Keating 2006, 
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6): people who, like Anzaldúa herself, straddle the threshold between liminal spaces of 
transformation. All borders are functionally human productions, as they serve to 
primarily stake ownership to a particular terrain and delineate, or divide, “natural” 
inhabitants from “other” kinds of stakeholders [eg, those who might try to penetrate a 
border]. My use of the term here is more ideological since I am chiefly interested in how 
borders can be ephemeral metaphors with longitudinal consequences for processes related 
to identity-development. One might argue virtually all institutions reify a particular kind 
of dominant/divisive thinking, or, function within particular parameters.  
My data suggests that an acknowledged, though unreconciled tension, however, 
exists between the hegemonic medical structure and the more chameleonic world(s) of 
peer support. That no-one, for instance, at any of the networks I engaged was a service-
provider did not negate the transactional culture of companionship. To the untrained 
eye—as mine was upon first learning about peer support—it might be difficult to spot 
and trace when, where, and how the healing takes place. All, for instance, of the networks 
I engaged in existed within a home institution; the BRC, for instance, is a peculiar case. It 
was the only RLC36 that occupied, simultaneously, multiple institutional spaces. Located 
on the physical grounds of the Boston University Medical Campus, its offices were 
housed on the basement floor of the SCFMHC, a building owned by the Massachusetts 
Department of Mental Health.37 The majority of the BRC’s more regular attendees also 
called the SCFMHC home in one of its several resident wards (in-patient units).  
																																																								
36 That I knew of/participated in. 
37 The SCFMHC is also home to a site office of Bay Cove, a social services agency. Bay Cove, as 
one peer explained, has partnered with the Boston University School of Medicine’s Department 
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As a vehicle through which what anthropologist Allan Young calls “traumatic 
memory38”, participating in peer support network activities—whether they be self-
directed and mediated sit-downs with suicidal ideation or hour-long karaoke sessions—
exemplify how ill bodies can be manipulated in ways that strike against popular ideation. 
The image of, as one moderator described, “some sick dude passed out in bed all day and 
alone,” is slowly being graffitied by more “radical” conceptions of health/care.  
Whereas the disabled would have been resigned to life as an “invalid”—
downtrodden and bedridden—acts of recovering in public indicate a shift towards an 
agential habitus, where one’s psychic disposition39 is subject to a battery of nuanced re-
trainings. The peer support groups teach, however subtly, sick people how to exist 
beyond the borders of patient-hood. They reveal new(er) possibilities for the self and its 
multitudinous expression, with illness recognized, though perhaps not thoroughly 
grappled with, as an identity component that influences and is influenced by other 
characteristics. PSNs offer “different formations of time, space, and agency” (Desjarlais 
1994, 171) whereby the concept of experience, for people who are chronically ill, goes 
beyond struggling along. 
   
																																																								
of Psychiatry to provide community stabilization units. Bay Cove has also, she gleefully shared, 
been a “really big employment opportunity for us.”  
38 Embodied trauma, in the form of memories, exist when sensations related to pain and fear have 
been normalized. In consequence, the person becomes trapped in a state of perpetual patient-
hood, whereby his/her only grasp of the world has been colonized by affliction.  
39 Literally: the habits that reveal themselves as placeholders in one’s daily life; how one accesses 
and claims space to/in the world through the body.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: RELATING PEER SUPPORT NETWORKS TO 
BIOMEDICAL PSYCHIATRY 
 
 
This chapter reviews the perceived function and efficacy of PSNs within the 
larger psychiatric industry. 
 
Storying an expression of mental illness 
 A few years ago, I found myself deep in conversation with “H.,” someone who is 
very surely “fucking insane” . . . as she said. I hadn’t communicated with her since junior 
fall, and our last conversation had been brief and superficial. I graduated college May 
2016. H., at the time, had been hospitalized…again. 
 By June 2018, I was in the thick of thesis fieldwork. I assumed that she, perhaps 
more than anyone else I went to college with, would appreciate my proposal. H. was a 
wealth of information. She should, I thought, have an opportunity to share. I thought she 
would jump at the chance.  
  I hoped so.  
 “So you want to interview me? But, like, for your own book? Why do you want to 
talk to a bunch of crazy people?”  
 “I’m not writing a book.” 
 “But why do you want to talk to me for?” 
 “What?” 
 “I’m just saying. Wow. No one’s ever interviewed me before. Why would I ever 
be interviewed? For what? I mean, like, who cares, you know?” 
  
78 
 “I think I do.” 
 “I don’t know. I mean, I’m still—I mean, you know my situation. Right? 
Obviously. So, like, I mean—so, your project is about mental illness. Okay. So you’re 
just doing a research thing.” 
 “I should describe my work in better detail, make it clearer. I’m sorry if I 
wasn’t—” 
 “Nah, you don’t have to say sorry. I mean, I get it. I get you. I just—shit, G. I 
don’t want to mess up your thing. You know my situation; I don’t know if I can help you 
since things are so fucked up. I’m really fucked up, dude.” 
 “You sound like a great fit!” We laughed, despite, or maybe because, of the 
tension. 
 “I mean, it’s like I can’t even be in my own head. You know what I mean? This 
shit is exhausting, right?” 
 Pregnant pause, until— 
 “I agree.”  
 I had many questions and I knew that getting satisfactory answers would be 
trying. When we’d first met junior fall, H. had been battling over her psychological 
stability and student eligibility with the Office of Academic Affairs. Several professors 
and staff had concerns about her ability to function. The Director of Counseling Services 
at the student infirmary gave her highest recommendations that the Office enact a 
medical leave on H.’s behalf.  
 And they succeeded.  
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 H. was exiled from campus before fall 2015. In July 2018, I mentioned when I 
was due in town to visit a professor-friend and we agreed to squeeze time to meet. 
Now back (and presumably “recovered”), the first words we’d exchanged were 
expletives. 
 “Fuck ResLife!”  
 My eyes bulged, more at the shock of seeing her after two years than at her 
greeting. Her grin, nonetheless, reached both ears. I watched, a bit apprehensive, as she 
set her bag and plate down at my earlier undisturbed table. The rest of the room 
continued customarily. Students bustled about, in their typical hurried ways: heads down, 
headphones in. In between H.’s swearing, I heard calls for medium chai lattes from the 
café. No one seemed aware of the ticking time bomb that had rolled its way to my corner 
of the world. And so began my informal case study on someone with mental illness. 
 “What?”  
 Though her eyes laughed, her voice was stern.  
 “I told them I needed a single apartment. Room, abode. A single, you know?40 
That’s what the disability forms were for. If they think I’m so damn disabled, why 
fucking put me with anybody else? By the end of the year, there’s a chance they’ll be 
disabled, too!”  
 By now, H. had stopped flustering long enough for me to begin my examination. 
Everything about her was precariously positioned. Her short curls were forced into a 
																																																								
40 I did, as I also applied for [and received throughout college] a single room as a disability 
accommodation. 
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thick bun that threatened to collapse with the slightest turn of her head. Her taped-
together, thick-rimmed glasses teetered so delicately over her nose that, with the slightest 
twitch, they might break entirely. Her stance, even while sitting, was so crooked that her 
body seemed horizontal. The weight of her being submerged her deeper into the ground 
with every passing second. She was a living Tower of Pisa.  
 “All I’m saying is that I’m glad when I’m kept by myself. I’ve got a place where I 
can just be alone and deal with my shit. And it’s good. It’s good for everybody, because I 
can’t guarantee nobody’s safety and can’t nobody guarantee mine.”  
She’d been institutionalized before (the intimate details she kept under wraps). I was 
unsure if her hospitalization(s) had been therapeutic, harmful, or an equally potent dose 
of both. “They’ve had me back and up there so many times and still can’t figure out 
what’s going on. I guess my depression and anxiety are too much for them to handle,” 
she explained. “I’m always so mad and sad and—and tired, but I guess that’s the 
fibromyalgia, or whatever, you know?”  
 (I did and didn’t at the same time.)  
 “Anyway, it’s an always kind of thing, being mad—but especially at them.” She’d 
clenched her fork so tightly that I believed her.   
 H.’s case is an unfortunately perplexing one. As a non-traditional student, 
harboring the effects of extensive family trauma, unfortunate socio-economic 
circumstances, and a history of being at a general dis-ease, she does not fit nicely into any 
strict boundary of personhood. While not healthy, H.’s is also not mentally ill enough (or 
willing) enough to consider herself disabled. She’s driving, dating, dealing with the fifth 
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year of her undergraduate career, doing an “okay” job at keeping a job, and dabbling in 
all sorts of drugs and noxious behaviors. She’s a “lunatic,” but, in some regard, an 
uncannily functional one. I decided she’d be as good a fit as any for this project. 
 Unsurprisingly, she agreed.  
 
How classified people enhance and adjust what is true of them41 
 What is commonly referred to as normal is almost always synonymous with 
generalizations based on aggregated data. The normal person is typically healthy, 
quantitatively average, and possesses no certain anomalies that would alter it from its 
current ideal state. This logic is often circular because abnormality is based on however 
normal is operationalized.  
 Science and technology studies scholar Joseph Dumit includes such a description 
in his discussion on “objective self-fashioning” (Dumit 2003; Dumit 2012, 20). This 
“logic, grammar, and regimen of pharmaceuticals” (Dumit 2012, 19) determine narratives 
of personal responsibility in healthcare. As we’ve become more modern subjects, we’ve 
also become effectively less autonomous in our decisions as health-care consumers, 
especially with regard to psychopharmaceutical intervention. Our decisions and views on 
our mindedness are linked to the idea of the patient operating as a citizen and capable of 
exercising a certain set of rights, values, obligations, and expectations.  
 He references Sam, an ex-depressive who, while still ill, sought psychiatric 
																																																								
41 This title is borrowed from a quote in philosopher Ian Hacking’s 1985 article, “Making up 
People.” 
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treatment after the death of his parents. Dr. Kramer prescribed Prozac and noted 
remarkable changes immediately after Sam began taking it. Sam reported an astounding 
shift in self-comportment, one that is difficult to quantify but might resemble a complete 
180 degree revolve from who he once was—or at least, thought he was.  
 The Prozac’s effects signaled some sort of mutation with Sam’s previous category 
of personhood—so much so that the real Sam was theoretically dormant, and had been 
for some time. Had it not been for Sam’s parents’ death, the onset of his depression, and 
Dr. Kramer’s Prozac—this complex product of scientific claims (that Sam was diseased 
and his case necessitated chemical intervention) and communicative technologies (the 
drug’s physiological mode of operation)—Sam might not have ever actualized his true 
self. 
 Like Sam, H.’s pathology and personality are so closely woven that it’s almost 
impossible to isolate symptom from quirk. It’s unclear whether she belongs in a 
psychiatric ward, should be checked into an intensive detoxification and rehabilitation 
program, under the careful watch of a probation officer, or just shacked up with her 
partner.  
 “I don’t know either,” H. shrugged. “I guess I like being with my boyfriend the 
most. He’s the only person this month that I haven’t had to take out my blade on—yet!”  
Mine and H.’s conversation knew no bounds. We conversed readily and often—while 
crossing paths in the science library, dining in the campus dining hall, and waiting at our 
local CVS pharmacies for our respective medications. Our most memorable interaction 
should have never happened.  
  
83 
 We were relaxing, or were trying to, in her room. I’d passed the early afternoon 
transcribing an interview. She’d spent the earlier hours drinking—or trying to—her pains 
away. It wasn’t until about 10:30 that morning that, after sensing her migraine and mood 
worsen, she decided against revisiting the liquor store.  
 I was posed, pen and notebook in hand, at her pill-bottled and noodle-encrusted 
desk. H.’s laptop was angled so that she could see the screen from the safety of her 
comforter. She was slumped in her usual spot—a corner meeting a wall and the head of 
her bed. We’d been in these positions for the past 42 minutes…sitting, staring, and silent. 
And, finally— 
 “Forget it. Just forget it.” 
 It was after five on a Friday afternoon. Today marked three months exactly since 
she last spoke with her social worker. They intended to Skype for this afternoon, where 
H. planned to surprise her with some good news. “She’ll have a ball,” H. jeered the night 
before. We were huddled over bowls of soup on the kitchen floor of her apartment. (H. 
found the provided chairs too uncomfortable for her back—something or another about a 
bulging disc in her lower spinal cord being poorly supported and a surgery not being fully 
covered by insurance.)  
 “She’ll get a big laugh outta all of this. You and me, it’s like I’m on Oprah or 
something. I haven’t even come out with my book yet! She’ll really love this shit.” 
  A sort of nurse navigator, Linda was responsible for helping H. re-orient herself 
(this time, more productively) within the medical and academic spheres she so 
precariously inhabited. Linda, I learned, was the only one who had believed she was 
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“really crazy, and not just having another bad fucking day,” and advocated for her first 
medical leave. During H.’s third hospitalization, Linda visited her. Once in three weeks, 
but still more than could be said for anyone else. In the three years that they’d been 
working together, H. had grown more than dependent on her social worker. She’d 
become irrevocably attached. 
  Linda was accomplished, compassionate, and expecting her first baby. From the 
pictures I could see scattered about the room, she was very young. Their smiles lit up the 
room—Linda and H. outside of a restaurant; Linda and H. in her office (presumably after 
a session); Linda and H. in the backseat of a Public Safety car; Linda with her hospital ID 
slung around her neck and H. in one of her hospital dresses.  
 “The least she could have done was let me know to re-schedule. Shit. I mean, it’s 
not like I didn’t have other things to do. Maybe she’s shacked up with another patient—
and that’s fine, but when you set up a time with someone, you—you keep it, you know? 
You don’t just fucking disappear. Shit.”  
 Recently, Linda had re-located to her home state of California, where she had 
found work as an adjunct professor at Berkeley. H. had mentioned (quite hurriedly) 
something or other about Linda being engaged, Linda and her fiancé (a surgeon) looking 
to purchase “a fucking house together, like the damn Brady bunch or something.” I 
assumed she was busy—with work, with her pregnancy, with her fiancé—with her own 
life, really. She had stopped seeing H. professionally over seven months ago, but H. 
looked forward to their seemingly rare “Hi, how are you?” check-ins. It was clear. Linda 
had moved on. She was yet another person in H.’s life who had done so, leaving her 
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behind. 
 H. had grown so upset that the outcome of this paper was in jeopardy. I remember 
how quickly she’d risen, at exactly 12:03pm, and reached to slam her laptop shut. Her 
already smudged mascara was now trickling down her ruddy cheeks. She’d (as politely as 
one could under these circumstances) asked me to “forget about it, just forget it, Gerpha, 
okay?” several times, while ushering me out of her room, through her kitchen, and out the 
front door.  
 The walk back to my professor’s house wasn’t long enough to escape the flood of 
guilt I suddenly found myself sinking into. I worried if she would be alright with my 
sharing the outcome of our mock interviews. I wasn’t sure how comfortable I felt doing 
so. Was I a bad peer for wondering how I was supposed to share in her pain? Was I an 
even worse person for thinking of ways I could use this in my thesis? I didn’t have to cry 
with her, but I could’ve at least fought harder to stay.  
 H. is both an anomalous case of high-level dysfunction and a commonplace 
example of the challenges of being clinically borderline42. Her symptoms manifest in 
ways that make it hard for technicians to exert any element of custodial care. Under these 
circumstances, it matters less about the kind of support network she has than the severity 
and progression of her disorder. I have some reason to believe Linda was not [as big of] a 
“damn, fucking backstabber bitch” that H. maintained. Certainly, I’d never met a 
clinician who’d been willing to so inextricably mesh her personal and professional lives. 
She wasn’t just doing her job, but doing so well. The commitment was unparalleled. The 
																																																								
42 In 2015, H. was diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder.  
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smiles decorating H.’s walls confirmed that. 
 Despite this commitment, Linda wasn’t really H.’s friend. Sure, she might have 
been friendly towards H., but, above all, it was likely a consequence of being a social 
worker. As good of a social worker as H. said she was, I expect that Linda had many H.-
like relationships. Reducing her relationship to H. as being “just another member of her 
medical “team” seems trivial, but is, nonetheless, true. Linda is—was—just doing her 
job. In fact, one could argue defiantly that the only relevant relationship they shared was 
in relation to Linda’s billing H.’s insurance company. To Linda (and likely the cohort of 
practitioners assigned to H.’s case), H. was one of the many clients she’d devoted herself 
to. However, to H., Linda was everything, and, suddenly, nothing all at once. No single 
medical expert in H.’s life—including Linda—really took on the personal H., but instead 
the symptomatic H.  
  How do you control someone whose edges are less sharp and more obtuse? That 
is, how do you keep H. from getting better at being sick and worse at masking it?  
 It seems you can’t do so very well. Traditionally regarded as physiological 
constructs, health, illness, and medicine are also social tools capable of being coopted to 
discriminate against and assign stigma among certain populations. We expect our 
caretakers to know what’s wrong, why it’s happened, and, most importantly, how to fix 
“it” (us, the presumed dis-eased). The subtle yet operative word here is “know.” It is 
suggestive of a sense of concreteness and stability that doesn’t explicitly exist in 
psychiatric practice (or in H.’s own life). 
 Who knows whether her outbursts are comedic or a sign of mental contamination? 
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Was the H. I’ve presented here an accurate depiction of the H. who struggles among us? I 
doubt I would be capable of producing a formal report on our interactions, due to the 
nature and manifestation of her disease. She has, I believe, been purposely vague in some 
of our conversations. In turn, I have been purposely vague in how and what I’ve relayed 
here. There have certainly been many times in our interactions where I’ve either been 
hesitant to laugh at her “jokes,” or disappointed at seeing them as such in the first place.  
She is “disturbed,” but is that a marked sign of bodily dysfunction? Indeed, some might 
argue (and do so well) that H. doesn’t have a brain or mental disorder, but is instead 
emotionally distressed—a result of consistent socio-political conflict to which the 
psychiatric enterprise is a contributing factor.  
 However, her functional capacities are at a level that perturbs our assumptions 
about how the stereotypical psychiatric patient should and would behave. They conflict 
with norms about presentability and contradict communal definitions for abnormality. 
Someone like Linda might disagree: H. is unwell, no doubt, but she’s slightly lower on 
the triage totem pole—low enough, say, for her to not so much as consider referring H. to 
another local practitioner before, according to H., “bum-rushing a damn plane.” Medical 
personnel—psychologists, psychiatrists, nurses, social workers—might be quick to 
reframe H.’s socially awkward realities lower within the general social hierarchy inherent 
in medical practice. Medical experts will often dismiss any research conducted by the 
patient as irrelevant to the “true” nature of their condition (the truth of this condition, of 
course, is to be dictated by the expert).  
 Furthermore, there is a significant concern among experts that researching one’s 
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supposed condition can only lead to some horrible self-actualization of another disease. 
Whatever the case, either hypothetical situation would be tantamount to the expert’s 
credibility, as the more complicated the case becomes, the more likely it is that another 
expert will have to be called in to assess the situation. The second expert’s medical 
hypothesis may differ extremely from his predecessor, to which yet another expert will be 
beckoned, and so on, until the loop is infinitely convoluted.  
 This is incredibly problematic when it comes to addressing perceived deviance in 
mental state and subjective identity. It ignores the possibility of stigma toward the 
mentally ill erasing the individual’s symptomatic experience, as well as the dangers of 
ableist language in portraying deviant mindedness (mental illness).  
 H.’s care team does not, or, is not devised to stay for the aftermath. I spoke about 
the institutional process related to discharging patients from a psychiatric ward/facility.  
In reviewing my notes, I found this excerpt especially illuminating: 
Internist (I): When a psych patient is let go, the conditions of their release have to 
consider how sick they were when they came in. So, I mean, the sicker you are, the less 
likely it is you’ll be out for dinner the same night. It’s not a blind let-go—it’s not like the 
hospital is an overcrowded prison looing to make room for incoming murders. We have 
facilities—hospitals, outpatient centers, homes—equipped to handle the population we 
serve.  
 
Gerpha (G): Really? Have you any thoughts about those Globe articles I gave you—the 
ones about the number of mentally ill patients, regardless if they are in crisis, going 
through the emergency rooms?   
 
I: Right, but, I mean, I’m only speaking about what I remember it was like in school, on 
rotation. I’m not a psychiatrist, but I remember working under them and that’s what it 
was like. 
 
G: So, the release isn’t like an ‘Oh, you’re free!’ kind of thing.  
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I: Oh, right, oh, absolutely not. I mean, it can’t be, right? If you think about it, how would 
that even work? 
 
G: Similarly to how the discharge and follow-up process works for other patients?  
 
I: Well, but we’re not talking about those kinds of patients. Psychiatric patients—look, 
the reasoning behind their hospitalization is vastly different from, say, someone 
admitted to the ER who is having heart palpitations and suddenly can’t talk. Their 
problems are different. They’re just different.  
 
G: And so is the approach to their care.  
 
I: Exactly, yes. Exactly. So, when you’re talking about just letting people go—psych 
patients, I mean, it’s on a case-by-case basis. We don’t have the means, as doctors, to 
keep a watchful eye on patients 24/7. So, every case is its own example. You can have 
two patients admitted at the same time, maybe even with the same diagnosis, but 
because of their chart, their insurance, their behavior while admitted, their home 
situations, all of that…they can have two different release plans, dates, outcomes.  
 
G: So, it’s conditional. 
 
I: Exactly. 
 
G: Just like parole. 
 
 H is instead shuffled from one network of providers to another. H. has, and most 
likely will continue having prolonged “stays”—at the University, in hospitals, in her 
manically depressed brain, and the like.  
 
Conclusion 
 Hacking rightly supposes that classifications lead to stereotyping behaviors. The 
subjects-to-be “modify their wares” and thus are reconfiguring their associated category. 
This, in popular reference, can be exemplified by the notion of self-diagnosis. What one 
  
90 
general practitioner described to me as “a nightmare for any type of clinician”, this is 
particularly harmful to psychiatric practice as the patient’s sense of autonomy (the idea 
that I can be an informed and vocal consumer) threatens to undermine that of the expert. 
 There are no cumulative expressions of mindedness. Assuming the opposite 
effectively points a disconcerting finger to those suffering without an audible voice. 
Stereotype threat increases for those associated to a particular category or level of 
abnormality. While this “other-ing” may exist as a means of navigating through the 
immaterial world and making sense of striking phenomena, it is important to recognize its 
overly simplifying effects. Umbrella terms for mental “illness” may be too broad for 
accurate conceptualization of individual experiences on the spectrum. As a result, there 
becomes the emergence of “Axis I”, “Axis II”, and “Axis III” disorders, disorders that 
fall under “psychotic”, disorders that fall under “NOS (not otherwise specified), disorders 
that encourage medication and a certain type of therapy, disorders with poor prognoses, 
and so forth. People are fluid beings. What happens when the label applied to “make 
sense of an interpreted behavior” no longer makes sense to the individual attached to it? 
Is it possible for an individual to occupy multiple conceptualizations of identity?  
Unfortunately, she is likely to suffer alone.  
 My major interest in Hacking’s “looping” argument is in deploying it towards an 
understanding of the creation and subsequent oppression of vulnerable groups of people. 
By recognizing previously “uncharted” and virtually neutral types of behavior as 
something else, there arise fundamentally dangerous consequences. The natural kind of 
entity is now marked with the singe of some level of deviancy. As abnormal, this entity’s 
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purpose and means of existence is subject to intense scrutiny that will ultimately re-shape 
its constituency.  The systems that regulate minded personhood operate at power-laden 
nexuses where exploitation of said criminalized groups is somewhat inevitable and 
necessary for the system to thrive. Prevalence of trust (or distrust), in specific scientific or 
biomedical claims, is often linked to power rankings within the systemic medical 
hierarchy and access to valid, objective resources. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter presents project findings and expands upon limitations introduced in 
the Introduction and Methods chapters. It concludes with insight into areas for potential 
development/improvement. 
 	
Findings  
 My project findings centered on the emergence of the transient life of the self. By 
“transient”, I suggest that our conceptualization of personhood—and the multiple 
boundaries it negotiates—is fluid. The physicist Evelyn Fox Keller posits that certain 
universals of legal (or moral) pre-requisites are “necessary to the notion of a “whole 
body” …[that has] full membership in the category of “human”” (Keller 2007, 353). 
Compare, for example, the following attempts at relating ideas of a/“the” self: 
 “The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less 
integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, 
judgment, and action, organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively against 
other such wholes and against a social and natural background is, however incorrigible it 
may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the world’s cultures” (Geertz 1974). 
* 
 “The beliefs, norms and techniques which have come into existence under the 
sign of psy over the last century about intelligence, personality, emotions, wishes, group 
relations, psychiatric distress and so forth are neither illumination nor mystification: they 
have profoundly shaped the kinds of persons we are able to be— the ways we think of 
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ourselves, the ways we act upon ourselves, the kinds of persons we are presumed to be in 
our consuming, producing, loving, praying, sickening and dying” (Rose 1996, 226).  
Central to these understandings, I believe, is the expectation that the self will 
encounter conflict and that the value of subjectivity will shift under emergent pressures. 
Given the intersubjective confluence of reality, practices of mediating tension—
regardless of its etiology—relies upon cultural context (setting), and to what extent 
scientific practices (discoveries, products) become enmeshed within one’s personal 
identity.  
How authority is grounded—how we learn to believe people and what they tell 
us—is directly related to their encompassing hegemonic framework. Perceived problems 
(eg, symptoms), their purported treatments, and treatment efficacy are judged within the 
same paradigm from which they emerged. Remember, for example, the story of Sam and 
his own reconstitution. Sam—or, as Dumit emphasized, Sam’s psychiatrist (and perhaps 
even more so, Sam’s psychiatrist’s anti-depressant prescription)—reconstituted his 
subjectivity from one of pathology to “true” personhood, one presumably free from the 
mar of psychological dysfunction.  
Several themes emerged in contemplation of personal experiences navigating the 
mental health care system, from participant observation, and as interview data.  
These include: 
• The nuanced definitions/use of words like “peer”, “recovery”, “mental illness”, 
“mental health”, and “disability.” I think this fluid interchange of ideas is a result 
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of paradigmatic shift in the conceptualization of disease categories, deviant 
behavior(s), and fluid dialectics of explanation (McHugh & Slavney 1983, 21).  
• An emerging politics of space and place as related to the conditional use of 
language and the right to claim certain personal identifiers 
• Troubling agency as both concept and as a set of actions 
• Harnessing hope as “recovery capital” (Cloud & Granfield 2008; Russo 2018) and 
progressing towards a more personal/ized kind of psy-medicine 
I anticipate this information will be especially illuminating for clinicians wishing 
to develop person-centered therapies. Above all, I hope this project sees my peers and I 
through better days and helps fuel future endeavors towards reformative mental health 
care attitudes, practices, and policies.  
 
Reviewing project scope  
 There are many things this project did not/could not do. I will address these here 
as they relate to the integrity/usefulness of an autoethnographic study.  
For one, I did not narrow my target population demographic. By “narrow”, I mean 
specify. This is a consequence of the breadth of my research question, which, as its own 
issue, is somewhat obtuse. I assumed, in devising my research question, that all mental 
illnesses have the potential to be recurring and, by virtue of their chronicity, 
progressively debilitating. This means that I neither “screened”, or emphasized, for the 
occurrence of a particular mental illness over another nor did I give particular weight to 
whether one mental illness was described across any one race, gender, sex, or class. It is 
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tempting to assume, by name alone, that the HVN network was the exception. It was not. 
The Network cautions that “Hearing voices has been regarded by psychiatry as ‘auditory 
hallucinations’, and in many cases a symptom of schizophrenia. However not everyone 
who hears voices has a diagnosis of schizophrenia” (Hearing-Voices.org). 
Two of the three PSNs I engaged in are part of RLCs. The Massachusetts 
Department of Mental Health does not restrict participation in any recovery learning 
community based mental illness typology43 (see figure 12).  
A potential benefit, however, in working with a broad research population is that 
my data (stories collected) are aptly generalizable. Ethnography functions as a means of 
yielding a holistic understanding, by way of rich detailing, of a culture-sharing group. 
While pluralistic approaches exist, an intended consequence is that the data collected can 
travel beyond the confines of the “new[ness] and strange[ness]” and into the realm of the 
familiar global. It is tempting to accept that what emerges from one particular group 
support meeting at one field site can blanket the experiences of any other one peer who 
happens to participate in a different support group/network. I believe—perhaps to a 
fault—that minutia is not a term applicable to people. Attempting to aggrandize intimate, 
and often stigmatized, expressions of embodiment is sloppy, perhaps unhelpful, and risks 
obscuring the original intention of the patient/peer/original storyteller. 
																																																								
43 For example: affective disorder versus psychotic disorder. 
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Figure 12: RLCs homepage.
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I also did not operationalize frequently used terms. By “operationalized”44, I mean 
ensure that something indirectly measurable is described and applied in a consistent way. 
Operationalizing variables, for example, assures a sense of reliability to research 
methodology. Operationalization within the social sciences is complicated by the fact that 
the presence of phenomenon “x” is largely inferred by the confluence of phenomena 
“yz”. In large, complex studies, the lack of operationalization can lead to variables and/or 
effects that confound the interpretation of the data. In devising my research question, for 
example, I equated the terms “chronic mental illness” and “psychiatrically disabled” to 
“severe and persistent mental illness.” Diagnoses that fall within this umbrella term can 
range from schizophrenic to autistic (Carey & Carey 1999). 
 Whether the latter can be operationalized—or, how the measure of psychiatric 
burden should be measured (Parabiaghi et al. 2006)—is unclear.  
 Those in the psychiatric rehabilitation sciences argue that the term should be 
subject to evolution: “The original intent of such terms as “serious”, “severe”, and 
“severe and persistent” mental illness was to secure funds for people who were unable to 
work or care for themselves in the community. The resulting term should reflect that and 
be consistent” (Kinter 2017). Kinter instead advocates using the phrase “people with 
mental illness” generally and “people with psychiatric disabilities” for people whose 
condition(s) have directly impeded their ability to work/engage in interpersonal 
relationships. 
 In an/other rendition, I would have liked to include pictures/detailed descriptions 
																																																								
44 Within the social sciences.  
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of the networks/groups. I could not. For one, I was barred, by the peer specialists leading 
group support meetings, from conspicuously documenting the happenings at any field 
site. This restriction was to guarantee that, as one specialist laughed, “Folks can feel an 
iota less like weird lab rats and more like cute guinea pigs.” While both rodents are 
subject to constant surveillance, the conditions surrounding said surveillance affect how 
they are perceived. Lab rats are examined in sterile settings. They are living tools. Guinea 
pigs, even while encaged, roam your living room. They are pets.  
Now, there are ways beyond snapping pictures that satisfy a rich description, and herein 
lies a second challenge. I conducted fieldwork across all three sites all in one day.  
This means that, on Thursdays, I was typically immersed in the field from 10am 
to 8pm. I was unable to take notes at any site while present and instead jotted reflections 
down hours after the fact. This meant that I relied on memory when producing field 
notes, as opposed to actively memorializing what piqued my senses. One problem with 
relying on memories like these, however, is that they are heavy. Not only was I tired, but 
my will to recall what was shared or experienced was embattled. Quite frankly, there 
were days I did not want to write, could not bring myself to write. I did not want, for 
example, to remember seeing someone walk into a group support meeting with fresh 
blood on their shirt sleeves. I sometimes could not, for instance, get myself out of my 
own ruminations to try re-storying someone else’s. So, I didn’t. And not doing so, I 
realize, has likely stunted the fruitfulness of my work.45  
																																																								
45 My productivity, or lack thereof, is also a reflection/consequence of my lived reality being 
chronically mentally ill and tangibly subject to the same constraints that I am researching.  
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Imagining opportunities for growth 
 My research question explores how people with chronic mental illness come to 
terms with the impact that their health/ability status has had on other components of their 
identity and sense of self. Were I to revisit this project, I would like to devote more 
energy towards exploring the language people use to describe their health conditions, 
relative to the various spaces they inhabit. For example, some folks in certain spaces—
like the Framingham chapter of the HVN— adopt a “person-first” approach. Others 
altogether refuse to acknowledge their way of being as one that is intrinsically 
pathologized. The BRC, for instance, discourages use of the word “patients” and refers to 
visitors, staff members of other regional recovery learning communities, and researchers 
associated with the larger University (e.g., Department of Psychiatry) loosely as “peers.” 
Insisting that mental illnesses cannot, or do not, fundamentally impact the essence of 
one’s personhood and/or opportunities in life is controversial.  
Consider the following excerpts that Sam Dylan Finch, a self-identifying mentally 
ill blogger, shared in an article for Everyday Feminism: 
“I have borderline personality disorder, complex PTSD, ADHD, and clinical 
depression. The acronyms alone are a lot sometimes. So, when I’m told that these are just 
“a small part of who I am,” I wonder what planet these folks are living on.” 
* 
 “The ways that I feel, think, and engage with the world have been shaped by my 
struggles with mental illness. They touch every relationship, every memory, every fear. 
How could this not, in some ways, define me?” 
  
100 
* 
 “The idea that mental illness is detachable can be a really harmful narrative to sell 
someone…For me, it’s held in every cell of my body and lives in the tension between 
breaths.” 
* 
 “If you were to add up all the hours I spend managing my mental health, it could 
easily be its own part-time job…I don’t get to take a break or unplug.” 
* 
 “‘Don’t let it define you’ is sometimes coded language for, ‘I’m uncomfortable 
with how visible you are as mentally ill’…Often times, the people who most readily 
preach about mental illness being minimally present come from a place of ableism – 
more specifically, they believe that the goal of recovery is to become as “neurotypical” as 
possible, rather than living well as mentally ill, on our own terms.” 
  
 The trend towards relocating modifiers reflects an effort to avoid reducing 
complex identities to presumably static diagnostic categories. I understand how, 
historically and politically, labels have shifted from a process of sense-making to tools of 
enacting harm. Because of this, I am probing the politics of person-first language (which 
emerged from a neoliberal, US evolution of the social model of disability (Shakespeare 
2006). I might argue that the notion of people-first language should be more inclusive of 
its agential perspectives and the compounded impact(s) one’s illness has on one’s sense 
of self. I contend that, someone who identifies as schizophrenic (rather than, say, having 
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schizophrenia) purposefully decides to emphasize a certain part of one’s identity over 
another. 
 I would have also liked to more thoroughly explore how psychiatric knowledge is 
reproduced by and distributed among the “lay” public. This would likely necessitate a 
more extensive media analysis of the (re)presentation of mental illness. I am curious how 
mis-or-inaccurate and/or dominant presentations of mental illness (e.g., schizophrenics as 
homicidal maniacs in the movies) contribute to stigmatization (e.g., the cultural 
assumption that schizophrenics are dangerous and scary). Though I am tangentially 
interested in how social constructions of illness influence help-seeking behaviors, this 
interest was not developed in this project, either. 
 My project incorporated perspectives46 from auto-ethnography. Given the 
opportunity, I would next fuse studies of pathography/illness narrative), epistemology, 
and philosophy of mind (specifically, phenomenological psychology as a qualitative 
research method)47. This combined approach would be my attempt at using narrative 
techniques to deconstruct psychiatry as a siloed institution of care/system of knowledge. 
 Finally, my research interests and my life are inextricably intertwined. I do not 
see myself studying anything else because I cannot imagine myself knowing any other 
kind of life. Their relationship, and influence, is reciprocal. I conducted my program of 
																																																								
46 Specifically, the fusion of self-reflexivity and the function of the anthropologist as researcher 
and subject (or participant-observer). 
47 See in particular: Bradley Lewis’s Narrative Psychiatry: How Stories can Shape Clinical 
Practice; Peter Rudnytsky’s A Multiple Birth: Psychoanalysis and Narrative Medicine; Michael 
Balint’s The Doctor, His Patient, and the Illness; and SK Toombs’s The Meaning of Illness: A 
Phenomenological Account of the Different Perspectives of Physician and Patient.    
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study and thesis project out of the hope that I would learn how to live with mental illness, 
as opposed to merely suffer. While I know it to be crucial, this sentiment might elude 
readers.  
 Perhaps if I were healthier while working on this project, I could be more 
transparent about my own journey. It seems fair, given that the whole of my project rests 
upon the willingness of strangers to talk about theirs. Presenting material culture, as 
opposed to mentioning snippets for the purpose of biased analysis, might read more 
holistically. This might range from artwork; shaky, scribbles in my notebook; hospital 
memorabilia; words of comfort from my bookcase; snippets of e-mail exchanges between 
professors, providers, and/or potential employers; and so on.  
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